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ABSTRACT

With the growth of the administrativestate, agency-promulgated
enforcement policy statements, typically referred to as guidelines,
have become ubiquitous in the U.S. federal system. Yet, the actual
usage and impact of such guidelines is poorly understood. Often the
issuing agencies declare the guidelines to be nonbinding, even for
themselves. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the government,
privateparties,and even the courtsfrequently rely on the guidelines
in a precedent-like manner.
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In this Article, Professor Greene examines the evolution of one
system of enforcement policy guidelines-the U.S. federal antitrust
merger guidelines--andfinds that these guidelines have acted as a
stealth force on the development of antitrust merger law. The
influence of this guideline system, she hypothesizes, emerges from a
process of institutionalizationthrough which the guidelines become
valued for more than the persuasive power of their ideas. This
institutionalizationprocess arguably has had an undue influence
upon common law development, as courts have failed to fully engage
the legal and economic substance of the guidelines. These findings
raise the more general concern that the courts have frequently ceded
their role as checks on administrative agency power operating
through nonbinding policy statements such as enforcement
guidelines. Such questions regarding the judiciary's role in the
separation of powers are broadly analogous to those raised by
Theodore Lowi regarding Congress's role in the legislativeprocess.
ProfessorGreene chronicles the history of the guidelines through
a series of case studies involving key elements in merger analysis.
Then, based on a review of all rulings from 1969 to 2003 concerning
section 7 of the Clayton Act, she generates basic quantitative
measures regardingjudicial references to the guidelines and then
qualitatively assesses the extent to which judicial reference to the
guidelines reflects substantiverelianceon them. Both the case studies
and statistical data provide strong evidence supporting the
institutionalization theory. Having raised normative questions
regardingguideline institutionalization,she then evaluates several
strategies to counter that influence and proposes conduct-oriented
recommendations.
Though specifics may vary, the unacknowledged phenomenon of
guideline institutionalizationis not unique to antitrustlaw. As such,
Professor Greene concludes this Article with an examination of
guideline institutionalizationin other contexts, including the FCC
and FERC, state consumer protection, and federal sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION

The constitutional character of key antitrust legislation, with its
open-ended articulation of competitive principles, is a source of both
strength and weakness. The statutory foundation of American
antitrust law-the Sherman Act, section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act, and section 7 of the Clayton Act-relies, by
design, on common law development to infuse them with practical
meaning. Common law development is, by nature, piecemeal. Since
the late 1960s, the antitrust agencies have relied increasingly on
guidelines, particularly in the area of mergers. Greater transparency in agencies' use of discretion is typically desirable. In this
Article, however, I argue that the merger guidelines have resulted
in a de facto, and ultimately undesirable, reduction in critical
analysis elsewhere in the system, particularly at the judicial level.
With the growth of the administrative state, agency-promulgated
enforcement policy statements, typically referred to as guidelines,
have become ubiquitous in the U.S. federal system. Yet, the actual
usage and impact of such guidelines is poorly understood. Often the
issuing agencies declare the guidelines to be nonbinding, even for
themselves. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the government,
private parties, and even the courts, frequently rely upon the guidelines in a precedent-like manner.
Consider the following example: Several prominent members of
the antitrust and economic communities strongly and publicly advocate an economic measure of market concentration. Nonetheless,
the antitrust bar virtually ignores the proposed measure for over a
decade, and the courts resoundingly reject it on the rare occasions
it is advocated. Once the Department of Justice (DOJ) endorses that
theory in its enforcement policy guidelines-a document that does
not bind that agency, let alone the courts-it is widely adopted by
judges and litigants and quickly becomes the dominant method of
analysis.
An even more extreme example characterizes the use of entry as
a defense to charges that a merger would be anticompetitive. The
federal antitrust agencies advocate a particular standard repeatedly
and the courts reject it. Nevertheless, the agencies incorporate
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that ostensibly unsuccessful standard into their enforcement policy
guidelines. The courts, then, not only endorse that guideline
standard, but also manage to overlook its arguable inconsistency
with their own prior rulings.
This Article examines the evolution of one system of enforcement
policy guidelines-the U.S. federal antitrust merger guidelines 1and finds that these guidelines have acted as a stealth force on the
development of antitrust merger law. The influence of this guideline
system emerges from a process of institutionalization through which
the guidelines become valued for more than the persuasive power of
their ideas. This institutionalization process arguably has had an
undue influence on the common law as courts have failed to fully
engage the legal and economic substance of the guidelines. These
findings raise the more general concern that courts have frequently
ceded their role as checks on administrative agency power operating
through nonbinding policy statements, such as enforcement
guidelines. Such questions regarding the judiciary's role in the
separation of powers are broadly analogous to those raised by
Theodore Lowi regarding Congress's role in the legislative process. 2
Part I provides background on enforcement policy guidelines
generally and the antitrust merger guidelines specifically. Part Ii
then chronicles the history of the merger guidelines. The history is
presented through several case studies of guideline usage involving
key elements in antitrust merger analysis: concentration ratios and
thresholds, market definition, and entry. In these case studies, to
the extent possible, I trace the impact of various guideline elements
on antitrust law development. Next, based on a review of all rulings
from 1969 to 2003 concerning section 7 of the Clayton Act, I
generate basic quantitative measures of guideline usage, such as the
number of references to the guidelines, and I then qualitatively
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "guidelines" pertain to the Department
of Justice merger guidelines. E.g., Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,101 (May 20, 1968) [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines]; Merger Guidelines, reprinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,102 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines];
Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,103 (June 14, 1984)
[hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines]; Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (Apr. 7, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
2. THEODORE J. LoWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AuTHORITY 128-46 (1969) (criticizing Congress for writing nonspecific legislation with
delegation that arguably transferred legislative power to the administrative agencies).
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assess the extent to which judicial reference to the guidelines
reflects judicial relianceon the guidelines. The case studies and data
provide strong evidence supporting the institutionalization theory.
Such an in-depth study is necessary to understand the nature of the
guideline influence and institutionalization, and the role of the
courts in those processes.
In Part III, I present a general theory of guideline institutionalization and use it to interpret the history of merger guidelines.
Several factors that contributed to the institutionalization of the
guidelines are explored, including the key mechanisms of deference
and framing. I also consider some broad trends in the use and the
extent of guideline influence. At the end of this Part, I consider and
reject the possibility that guideline influence could be explained
solely by the congruence of the guidelines with existing law.
My interpretation of the evidence strongly suggests that the
guidelines were a far more significant part of the antitrust legal
development process than their technical status as mere nonbinding
guides for agency prosecutorial discretion would suggest. Given this
assessment, in Part IV, I normatively assess the impact of guidelines on the discourse that shapes merger law, evaluate several
strategies to counter that influence, and propose conduct-oriented
recommendations intended to encourage the courts, as well as other
participants in the legal discourse, to exercise greater skepticism
regarding guideline approaches. Finally, Part V explores additional
aspects of institutionalization by examining (1) merger review
policies at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), (2) nonbinding
interpretations of unfairness powers at the FTC, and (3) the
implications of deinstitutionalization-the recent change to
nonbinding status--on decisions involving U.S. federal sentencing
guidelines. This selective review of other nonbinding agency policy
statements demonstrates the value of the institutionalization
perspective for understanding the means through which nonbinding
guidelines influence society. Though specifics may vary, the
phenomena of guideline influence and institutionalization are not
unique to antitrust. The evidence presented here, therefore, raises
fundamental questions regarding the general role of guidelines in
judicial discourse.
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I. GUIDELINE ROLES
Before considering the different roles guidelines can play, the
term "guideline" itself is worth defining. In administrative law
terms, the enforcement guidelines at issue are "general statements
of policy."3 "An agency policy statement .... represents an agency
position with respect to how it will treat-typically enforce-the
governing legal norm.... The agency retains the discretion and the
authority to change its position ...
When
V.4
promulgating policy
statements, such as enforcement guidelines, agencies are not subject
to the Administrative Procedure Act.5 Such policy statements do not
bind the courts as a matter of law.6
As a practical matter, enforcement policy guidelines generally
consist of an integrated set of elements, each of which may include
an analytical approach-for example, a method to define an
antitrust market--combined with one or more concrete determinations, such as a threshold concentration level above which illegality
is most likely, that provide benchmarks for the implementation of
that analysis. Guideline influence occurs on two levels. First, the
guidelines' analytical approach or underlying philosophy may frame
the general parameters of the analysis.7 Second, specific concrete
determinations of the guidelines, such as analytical cutoff points or
thresholds, may also be given weight. Though the former channel
for influence is more subtle than the latter, it is potentially much
more important.
Guidelines can be understood in terms of the express role the
agencies intended and the related role that they were likely to play
and indeed have assumed. The routinely cited goal for guidelines is
increased consistency and predictability of the enforcement policy.
3. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000).
4. Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90,94 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "The primary distinction
between a substantive rule-really any rule-and a general statement of policy ... turns on
whether an agency intends to bind itself to a particular legal position." Id.
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
6. See infra Part III.B.3.
7. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984) (discussing the psychology of choice and resulting outcomes in
the context of decision making).
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A second de facto guideline function is to comment on the existing
law. Though less explicitly acknowledged, the provision of such
commentary is an important guideline function.
A. Express Role: Explain Reasoning and Analysis Underlying
Agency Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion
On the most basic level, antitrust guidelines constitute the
federal agencies' codification of their enforcement policies. In the
first instance, then, these guidelines must be understood in terms
of how the agencies navigate the sphere of prosecutorial discretion
available to them. This function is particularly important within the
antitrust realm, given that its statutory basis is extremely vague
and open-ended. "In the field of economic regulation, the antitrust
laws of the United States are unique for their generality. The open
texture of many antitrust statutes ... elevates the importance of the
design and capability of institutions assigned to implement them."'
Within the merger context, the lodestar for all analysis is section
7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes mergers for which the result
"may be ....
[a] substantial lessening of competition."9 Section 7 does
not prohibit all mergers, not even all of those between competitors.
Section 7 also does not adopt any particular test for the measurement of relevant markets, or any particular definition for what
constitutes a "substantial lessening of competition."'" Moreover,
its reference to effects that "may" lessen competition indicates a
concern with probabilities, not certainties. " The result within the
merger context, as elsewhere in antitrust, is that legislative design
has placed on the courts a central role in determining the scope of
the law.
As a practical matter, the merger guidelines have both internal
and external audiences. The internal audience includes staff
attorneys and agency leadership. For example, the key agency
decision makers, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust or the
8. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 470 (2003).
9. Clayton Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides
the primary statutory basis for challenging mergers.
10. Id.
11. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
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Commission, may use guidelines to make their enforcement policies
clear to agency personnel. In addition, guidelines enhance continuity across administrations as they educate and steer new attorneys.
The external audience includes both private attorneys and
businesspersons. Greater enforcement consistency results in greater
certainty for businesses, thereby allowing them to make betterinformed decisions. It also enhances self-policing of anticompetitive
mergers by private parties. Rather than leaving the public to
discern enforcement policy through disparate enforcement actions
and other communications, such as speeches, the provision of a
single enforcement policy statement increases the consistency and
clarity of the messages conveyed. 2
B. Implicit Role: Commentary on the Law
Even if the primary purpose of agency guidelines is to guide
prosecutorial decisions, the guidelines necessarily comment on the
existing law. They are an agency response to gaps, ambiguities, or
judicial rulings that the agency perceives as misguided. Thus,
guidelines can and have been promulgated that diverge from the
common law in numerous ways.' 3 For example, when the case law
allows for consideration of a wide range of factors when evaluating
a particular question, the guidelines may signal which factors
deserve the greatest emphasis, as well as offer frameworks for
analyzing them. At other times, the guidelines may aggressively
introduce concepts, such as particular economic theories, which
have not yet been the subject of substantial discussion in judicial
settings. Though many have argued that the substantive effect of
the ideas embodied in the merger guidelines has been positive, 4 the

12. In any event, whether a nonpublic enforcement policy could, in fact, remain nonpublic
for long is also unclear.
13. See infra Part III.C.1-3.
14. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement
at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word-Continuity, Speech Presented Before the ABA
Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 2001), availableat www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
murisaba.htm (commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Hart-Scott Rodino Act,
and characterizing the 1982 Merger Guidelines as "a milestone in antitrust" which 'laid the
foundation for today's merger enforcement").
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process by which this influence has been exerted should give one
pause.
II. THE IMPACT OF GUIDELINES ON MERGER LAW

This Part chronicles the rise of the federal antitrust merger
guidelines. When first introduced in the late 1960s, their status in
the courts was uncertain. By 1992, however, the guidelines were
the impetus for the court to effectively reverse itself on a key legal
matter involving the standard for entry.1 5 This Part presents this
extraordinary evolution. The process by which the guidelines acquired increasing influence was, in its general contours, gradual. In
fact, it is only through understanding this gradual nature that one
can understand how the guidelines were able to become the
authority they are today. Unfortunately, this gradual transformation does not ensure that the changes resulted from careful
consideration by the courts. Examples that underscore the absence
of such reflection are provided subsequently.
The history of the merger guidelines can be divided into three
primary phases: (1) their introduction in 1968, (2) their fundamental revision-effectively a rewrite-in 1982, and (3) the next
substantial revision in 1992. For each guideline revision, I examine
one or more significant guideline elements that differed from the
common law that existed when the elements were introduced. Later
guideline modifications included some elements that diverged
significantly from the law at the time of issue but that the courts
later implicitly accepted. These different guideline case studies
present specific instances of guideline influence. When viewed in
succession, the story is one in which the guidelines gained increasing influence over key legal interpretations. I supplement these case
studies with broader quantitative measures which measure the
frequency with which courts have referenced the guidelines and the
degree to which they have relied on them. These quantitative
measures support the story the case studies convey regarding
increased guideline influence.

15. See infra Part II.A.3.
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A. Case Studies in Guideline Usage
In this Section, I analyze how the guidelines influenced the
development of merger law by studying several substantively
significant guideline components: (1) concentration measures, (2)
the thresholds applied to those measures, (3) market definition, and
(4) entry. I address the guidelines in roughly the chronological order
of their promulgation and analyze representative rulings, which are
supplemented at times with other documents such as briefs and
transcripts.
1. 1968 Merger Guidelines
On their face, the antitrust merger guidelines are statements
of enforcement policy issued by antitrust agency leadership. They
convey agency enforcement priorities to those both within and
outside of the agency. Antitrust law traditionally categorizes
mergers and the relevant markets along a continuum of anticompetitive risk. Historically, these categorizations relied heavily on
concentration within an "antitrust" market, with higher concentration correlated to higher antitrust risk. The most noteworthy
feature of the 1968 Merger Guidelines, reflecting the dominant
analysis at the time, was their treatment of concentration measures.
On this issue, the guidelines diverged considerably from the letter
and spirit of the common law prevailing at the time they were
issued.
Prior to 1968, courts typically employed the four-firm (CR4)
concentration measure in merger analyses, representing the sum
of the market shares for the four largest firms."6 The legal standard
for market concentration and increases in market concentration
evolved in such a way that small acquisitions in relatively unconcentrated industries became illegal. In the Supreme Court's 1966
16. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE (2005) (In the 1960's and 1970's courts and the enforcement agencies most often
looked at the 'four-firm concentration ratio' (CR4) to determine the degree of danger present
in a particular market."). Variants of CR4, such as the two- (CR2), six- (CR6), or eight-firm
(CR8) ratios were also employed. See, e.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F.
Supp. 729, 748 (D. Md. 1976) (discussing CR2, CR4, and CR8).
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ruling in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., the Court enjoined the
acquisition of a firm that would have resulted in a merged entity
holding 1.4% of the stores (7.5% of the sales) in the market, with an
increase of 1.1% in CR2 and a 3.3% increase in CR6.' 7 By today's
standards this level of increased concentration seems relatively
insignificant."8 Reflecting a concern for the direction in which the
majority was taking the Court, Justice Stewart wrote in dissent,
"[t]he sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under
[section 7 of the Clayton Act], the Government always wins." 9
The 1968 Guidelines designated specific CR4 thresholds for
"highly concentrated" markets and indicated that the DOJ would
ordinarily challenge horizontal mergers in such markets when
acquirer and acquired firm market shares were at or above particular values. For example, given a particular market concentration, a
15% market share firm acquiring a 1% market share firm would
typically be challenged." Though the guidelines' specific thresholds
bore some relationship to the thresholds gleaned from case law, they
nonetheless departed from contemporary judicial rulings. The
primary deviation was that the guidelines typically raised the level
at which mergers would not be challenged. In addition to their
horizontal merger thresholds departing from Von's Grocery, the
guidelines' vertical merger thresholds reflected a comparable
departure.2 1
The 1968 concentration thresholds often framed the terms of the
debate in subsequent arguments and judicial rulings. In United
States v. Hammermill Paper Co.,22 the contested areas in the
parties' stipulations with respect to market concentration were
framed heavily in terms of the guidelines:

17. 384 U.S. 270, 302 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Debra A. Valentine, Assistant Dir. for Int'l Antitrust, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
The Evolution of U.S. Merger Law, Speech Presented before the INDECOPI Conference 5
(Aug. 13, 1996), available at www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvperumerg.htm#N-l_ ("Today,
virtually all in the antitrust field doubt that competition was seriously threatened.").
19. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1(5).
21. See Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion,
Efficiency, and Failure,71 CAL. L. REV. 497, 512 (1983).
22. 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines consider a market
as highly concentrated if the shares of the four largest firms
amount to approximately 75% .... In 1971 ... the top 20 firms,
with a cumulative share of 74.0%, did not reach the 75% level
postulated by the Guidelines as a bench mark of high concentration when held by the top four firms."
A contested stipulation with respect to entry also referred to the
1968 Guidelines levels.24 The court found for the defendant and
dismissed the complaint.
In Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp.,2 5 the U.S. district court relied
almost exclusively upon the guidelines for several key points. The
Crane court, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States
v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc.,2" stated that "the 'potential entrant'
doctrine" was only applicable to "highly concentrated" industries.
The court then proceeded, in summary fashion, to find that the CR4
was 64%, and "thus the market is not highly concentrated."2 8 The
court's sole authority for this pivotal determination was the 1968
Guidelines.2 The court's subsequent discussion of the horizontal
claim involved a two-fold reliance on the guidelines as well. The
court repeated its guideline-based assessment that the market was
"not highly concentrated,"'0 and then it applied the guideline
standard. The court stated that "the Department of Justice does not
oppose [such] mergers ... on the ground that the anticompetitive
effect is not substantial.""1
Reliance on the merger guidelines, however, was by no means
universal. Consider Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 2 which was
23. Revised and Final Pre-trial Stipulation at 40, United States v. Hammermill Paper Co.,
429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (No. 89-68 Erie).
24. See id. at 39.
25. 509 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1981).
26. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
27. Crane Co., 509 F. Supp. at 124 n.6.
28. Id.
29. See id. By the late 1970s, the guidelines' thresholds were arguably more consistent
with the case law than was true in the late 1960s. Assuming that these later cases were
reasonably clear on the thresholds, the most natural reference would be to recent rulings
rather than to the 1968 Guidelines.
30. Id. at 124.
31. Id. at 124-25. "Though [the 1968] guidelines are not binding on the courts, they are
often paid some deference." Id. at 125.
32. Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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decided seven months after Crane and did not reference the
guidelines. The Grumman court adopted a definition of "tight
oligopoly" as an industry in which the CR8 is greater than 50% and
the largest firms control greater than 20% market share.33 The
court used this definition adopted from Stanley Works v. FTC" as
the "high concentration" benchmark establishing a presumption of
substantial anticompetitive effect.3 5 The result was considerably
more enforcement-minded than the equivalent standard in the 1968
Guidelines.3"
While the use or nonuse of the particular guideline thresholds is
instructive, what is most critical about the guidelines is their
treatment of a lower threshold. Prior to the 1968 Guidelines'
introduction, ever-diminishing market share increases were
sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction or outright section 7
violation.3 7 Therefore, the guidelines' explicit identification of a
concentration level-albeit extremely low-beneath which actions
likely would not be instituted, diverged profoundly from both
the letter and spirit of the prevailing rulings. Former FTC
Commissioner Thomas Leary, reflecting on this guideline provision,
commented that "Donald Turner [the author of the 1968 Guidelines]
... has never been given sufficient credit for what some at the time
considered to be an act of considerable moral courage."3 Regardless
of whether one agrees with Leary's substantive endorsement of the
guidelines, clearly the guidelines, in staking out a lower threshold
position, helped stem the trend towards finding increased concentration to be per se illegal.3 9

33. Id. at 95 (quoting Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1972)).
34. 469 F.2d 498.
35. Grumman, 527 F. Supp. at 95.
36. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § I(5)-(6).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 302 n.35 (1966) (noting
slight increases can make a merger inherently suspect).
38. Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 108-09 (2002).
39. See Howard R. Lurie, Mergers Under the Burger Court:An Anti-antitrustBias and Its
Implications, 23 VILL. L. REv. 213, 214 (1978); see also Dan W. Schneider, Evolving Proof
Standards Under Section 7 and Mergers in TransitionalMarkets: The Securities Industry
Example, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1, 25 (noting that, "[d]espite the precautionary statements in
[United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963),] presumptive illegality
grew increasingly irresistible analytically" in the mid-1960s).
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2. 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines-Departmentof Justice;
1982 Merger Statement-FederalTrade Commission
In 1982, the DOJ extensively revised its 1968 Guidelines. 40 The
same day the DOJ released its revised guidelines, the FTC released
its comparable enforcement policy document, Statement of Enforcement Merger Policy (1982 Statement).41 This Subsection's primary
focus on the 1982 Guidelines reflects the fact that they more greatly
influenced the courts than did the 1982 Statement. The 1982
Guidelines also received substantial attention from the FTC
administrative law judges and commissioners alike. 42 Relatively
minor changes were made to the 1982 Guidelines in 1984. 43
The 1982 Guidelines must be understood both within the context
of the prevailing common law and in comparison to the prior guidelines. Though a degree of continuity characterized the relationship
between the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines, and between the 1982
Guidelines and the common law, several key differences exist. As
one scholar and former DOJ official has observed, "[alt a bare
minimum, [the 1982 Guidelines] symbolize a more favorable
attitude toward mergers. This general impression may be of greater
consequence over the long run than the Guidelines' actual provisions. 44

40. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1.
41. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, reprintedin 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,200 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Statement]. See generally Hillary
Greene, Agency Character and the Character of Agency Guidelines: An Historical and
InstitutionalPerspective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1039 (2005) (discussing several key differences
between the DOJ and FTC policies).
42. See infra Graph 3.
43. These revised guidelines, the 1984 Merger Guidelines, clarified a number of points,
such as the use of the five percent test, and the consideration of efficiencies. See 1982 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.11, 3.5. They also made some small changes to the 1982
Guidelines. For example, the time period to identify production substitution changed to one
year from six months. Id. § 2.21. There was also discussion of several factors important to
assessing the competitive significance of concentration data. Id. § 3.4. The 1984 Guidelines
also emphasized that they were not rigid mathematical formulas that were unresponsive to
market realities. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement To Accompany Release of 1984 Merger
Guidelines, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103, at 20,551-68 (June 14, 1984). This
Article's references to the 1982 Guidelines encompass the 1984 revisions unless otherwise
indicated.
44. Kauper, supra note 21, at 505.

2006]

GUIDELINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

787

Donald Turner, the author of the 1968 Guidelines, wrote the
following about the 1982 Guidelines:
[The Guidelines] broadening the scope of the factors considered
in making prosecutorial decisions over a wide range of cases will
lead courts to incorporate those factors in the legal standards
applied by them. Now, [the Supreme Court's rulings in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)] and
Marine Bancorporationmoved in this direction, but they could
be narrowly construed, and the Guidelines will encourage a
broader construction....
I am inclined to believe that the new Guidelines, while highly
professional from an economic perspective, go unduly far in
complicating the decision-making process.4 5
Turner's observation that guideline identification of particular
factors would translate into the courts' grappling with these factors
epitomizes the manner in which guidelines can impact common law
development. Guideline-based reasoning need not result in different
outcomes (though it could), but the underlying analysis may change.
Turner recognized that the guidelines might affect lower court
interpretations of the landmark Supreme Court cases to some
nontrivial degree. And not only did the guidelines introduce specific
and more complex economic analyses into merger review, the
guidelines introduced a subtle shift in expectations about the
criteria necessary for any "proper" analysis of antitrust issues.
Finally, Turner appeared to question the value of the 1982 Guidelines' increased economic precision given the practicalities associated with legal decision making. This theme of excessive reliance on
economic theory would be echoed by others and extended to
encompass the additional administrability problems that such an
approach would pose to the enforcement agencies.46

45. Donald F. Turner, Observations on the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger
Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 308-09 (1982).
46. See, e.g., Gina M. Killian, Note, Bank Mergers and the Department of Justice's
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Critique and Proposal, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 857, 867
(1994).
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a. HHI: Changingthe Frame for ConcentrationMeasurement
As previously discussed, market concentration is a fundamental
element of merger analysis. 47 The 1982 Guidelines revised the 1968
Guidelines and modified what had been common law practice
regarding concentration on multiple levels. The revised guidelines
introduced a relatively new concentration measure, provided
different analytical approaches, and allocated a greater role for
nonconcentration factors.4"
The "new"5 concentration measure the guidelines employed was
the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI).4 9 The HHI for a market is
the sum of the squares of the market shares in that market.5 ° For
example, a market consisting of five 20% market share firms has an
HHI of 2000 (202 + 202 + 202 + 202 + 202). Because the HHI squares
the market shares of the firms in the relevant market, it weights
large market share firms more heavily in relation to smaller market
share firms. The CR4 measure, in contrast, treats various combinations of large and small firms adding up to the same CR4 number
as equally concentrated. For example, in a market in which the four
largest firms comprise 80% of the market, with shares of 20% each,
the CR4 will be 80%. If the fifth-largest firm has the remaining 20%
market share, the HHI would be 2000. To underscore the difference
between the HHI and CR4 measures, now assume that the largest
firm has a 60% market share and the next three combined have a
20% market share, with the remaining share held by a large
number of small firms. The CR4 of this alternative market is still
80%, but the HHI for this market increases to more than 3600. 51
An HHI-type measure had been discussed widely in economic
circles since at least the early 1960s, including in an important
article by economist George Stigler.5 2 It was a part of mainstream
47. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
48. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supranote 1, §§ 2.11, 3.1, 3.4.
49. See generally Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the HerfindahlHirschmanIndex, 71 CAL. L. REv. 402 (1983).
50. Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 793, 1010 n.33 (1973).
51. The competitive significance of the switch between measures depends in part on the

levels of concentration-or, in other words, the thresholds-that are treated as posing
competitive risk. The treatment of thresholds is considered in the next subsection.
52. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 49, at 410-15. See generally George J. Stigler, A Theory
of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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legal literature since at least 1969, when then-Professor Posner
advocated its use.5" Yet, HHI was largely absent from section 7
rulings until after the 1982 Guidelines were introduced. Prior to
that time, case law was written almost entirely in terms of CR4 or
its variations (CR2, CR8). Only six section 7 rulings from 1970 to
1982 reference the HHI. 4 Even more surprising than the infrequency with which HHI arose was the reception it received when
considered at all.
The first ruling of any kind discussing HHI was the FTC
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 1972 opinion in Litton Industries,
Inc.55 The ALJ, relying extensively on the HHI measure, had
dismissed the complaint.5 6 The Commission reversed the AIU and
stated, "[w]e believe that the traditional four-firm concentration
ratio analysis is well suited for the purpose of merger law enforcement and see no compelling reason to ignore it in this case."5 7
Commissioner Dennison concurred with the Commission's finding
of a section 7 violation, but further stated that, "[i]n view of the
asymmetry of market shares ... I do not place great weight on
increases in [CR2 and CR4]."5 Therefore, he saw "no error in the
use of [HHI] since economists use this or similar indices of disparity
to measure concentration where there is asymmetry in market
shares."5 9 However, Dennison continued, the AIJ failed to recognize
that the "statistical peculiarity of [HHI, unlike CR2 and CR4] ... is
that it tends to be skewed toward very small values."'6
The next case discussing HHI, United States v. Black & Decker
Manufacturing Co., expressly rejected the new measure.6 ' Though
the district court ultimately found for the defendants, it rejected the
HHI method of concentration they proposed. "In lieu of concentration ratios, defendants advocate the use of the Herfindahl index ....
The critical problem with the Herfindahl index, aside from its non53. See generally Richard C. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
54. See Calkins, supra note 49, at 410-15.
55. 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973), vacated, 85 F.T.C. 333, modified, 86 F.T.C. 589 (1975).
56. Id. at 979.
57. Id. at 1010.
58. Id. at 976 (Dennison, Comm'r, concurring).
59. Id. at 976 n.5.
60. Id.
61. 430 F. Supp. 729, 748 n.38 (D. Md. 1976).
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recognition by the courts which have uniformly used concentration
ratiosand its concomitant lack of comparability to data from earlier
authority," is that it could distort the concentration of the market if
one or two firms have sizable shares and there are many smaller,
insignificant firms.6 2
Five years later, in Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., the court
merely observed in a footnote that the HHI, as well as the CR4 and
CR8 indices, were "[a]ccepted measures of concentration."6 3 Of
course, as economist George Stigler, soon to be a Nobel Laureate,
was an expert in this case,' one might wonder whether the court's
gratuitous approval of HHI reflected more on the court's respect for
Stigler than for the concept itself.
Another notable feature of these early cases referencing HHI was
that in each instance a private party, invariably the defendant,
introduced the HHI index. This pattern was understandable. One
could well imagine that defendants, failing under traditional
measures, would be most likely to employ HHI. If a plaintiff,
including the government, failed under the traditional measures, it
had the option not to bring the case at all. Therefore, arguably fewer
incentives existed to use HHI offensively, at least not as the sole
concentration measure, until either it was "endorsed" in some
manner or other more traditional arguments were problematic. The
same did not hold true for defensive use of HHI. In sum, despite a
clear appreciation of the critical features distinguishing HHI from
CR measures, as reflected in Litton and the economic and legal
literature both in terms of the HHI's relative superiority and
inferiority, the HHI measure was largely absent in rulings until the
DOJ endorsed it in the 1982 Guidelines.
HHI immediately became a staple of the courts after the 1982
Guidelines were issued, though a transition period existed during
which the typical judicial treatment recognized both CR4 and HHI
concentration measures.6 5 Even during this period of dual reliance,
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. 530 F. Supp. 315, 323 n.15 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
64. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378,379 (6th Cir. 1981); see Calkins, supra
note 49, at 413 n.75.
65. During this time, an increasing percentage of cases were brought by the agencies
rather than by private parties. See infra note 183. That might have accounted for the HHI
measure being used within DOJ cases in particular. However, that fact did not explain either
the judiciary's swift adoption of the HHI measure or the dominance of the use of HHIs that
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the HHI measure was typically emphasized over the CR measure.
In a sample of thirty-eight rulings from 1985 to 1990 which included
nearly all of the rulings involving the DOJ and private parties as
plaintiffs, I found that when CR and HHIs were both mentioned, the
HHI concentration measure dominated the discussion and holdings
in a very strong majority of the rulings.6
During this transition period, one would have expected some
judicial weighing of the two measures' relative merits, especially
given the poor treatment of HHIs in pre-1982 cases and the
potential for the two measures to produce significantly different
concentration assessments in some cases. Yet, I have identified only
one case including such a discussion.67 Though most cases may not
have necessitated an engagement of this issue, this lack of engagement appears to have allowed the HHI measure-with its increased
weighting of large firms-to reframe the legal analysis without
meaningful debate.6 8 Ultimately, one cannot fully evaluate the
I found in cases involving only private parties. The switch to reliance on HHIs can even be
seen in Great Lakes Chemical Corp., a case that the FTC filed in 1981 and in which it entered
a consent order in 1984. 103 F.T.C. 467,467 (1984). The FTC's complaint only referenced CR2
and CR4. See id. at 469-71. However, the FTC complaint counsel's brief before the
Commission in 1983 relied most heavily on HHI, though HHIs were not mentioned in the
ruling. Trial Brief Supporting Complainant, Great Lakes, 103 F.T.C. 467 (No. 9155).
66. Of the thirty-nine rulings, eleven did not discuss concentration, and eleven were
primarily concerned with the market shares of the parties to the acquisition rather than their
concentration in the market. Of the remaining seventeen rulings, HHI was the primary
concentration measure discussed in ten rulings, see, e.g., Consol. Gold Fields v. AngloAm.
Corp. of S. Africa, 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and was equally treated with CR in five
other rulings, see, e.g., United States v. Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985). There
were only two rulings in which the CR measure dominated. Montfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc., 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985) (using only the CR measure), rev'd, 479 U.S. 104 (1986);
Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (including HHI analysis in a footnote).
67. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
68. This lack of debate did not appear to reflect an emerging substantive consensus on the
HHI. Empirical work on the relative value of the HHI measure was inconclusive. See, e.g.,
Calkins, supranote 49, at 417 ("Empirical work in the United States and other countries also
has failed to result in a clear preference for the HHI over the more traditional CR's."); Kauper,
supranote 21, at 511 ("Mhe use of the HHI as the measure of concentration is controversial.
It may overemphasize the disparity in size among firms in the market

....

");

see also Neil B.

Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex and the New Antitrust Merger
Guidelines: Concentratingon Concentration,62 TEX. L. REV. 453, 506 (1983) ("[D]ecisionmakers should look to a number of indicators of concentration in making their ultimate
determination."). The FTC's 1982 Statement endorsed neither the HHI nor the DOJ's specific
thresholds, and instead indicated that it would continue to look closely to concentration
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significance of changing concentration measures without understanding the fate of the accompanying thresholds. This is addressed
next.
b. Market ConcentrationThresholds
The 1968 Guidelines helped cement the notion of a single,
universally applicable market concentration threshold in merger
law. But these thresholds were based entirely on CR4 and related
concentration measures that did not have clear HHI equivalents.
This was because, as discussed previously, the same HHI value
could give rise to a range of CR4s. 9 This subsection explores the
comparability of the two standards, the substantive basis for their
divergence, and the nature of their adoption outside the federal
antitrust agencies.
In both the 1968 and 1982 guidelines, the concentration thresholds consisted of a criterion for determining if the underlying
market was highly concentrated and an indication of the increase in
market concentration that was likely to trigger a challenge.70 The
1982 Guidelines changed those thresholds. Many viewed these
thresholds as relatively arbitrary. For example, William Baxter, the
primary author of the 1982 Guidelines, remarked that
[t]he lines themselves [that is, the HHI thresholds] are arbitrary, and reflect the fact that we were born with ten fingers and
have gotten used to a base ten system. They have no magical
qualities beyond that....

measures, which may come in the form of HHI or other measures, though "a more refined
treatment of that data is in order." 1982 Statement, supranote 41, § II. Traditionally, the EU
had relied more heavily on CRs rather than HHIs. Juan F. Briones-Alonso, European Study
Conf., Oligopolistic Dominance: Is There a Common Approach in Different Jurisdictions?,
9-10 (Nov. 18, 1995), http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speechesltext/spl995_
036_en. In their 2004 Guidelines, the EU now relies quite heavily on the HHI measure. See
generally Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5 (EC) (defining how the EU
Commission assesses horizontal mergers).
69. See David S. Weinstock, Some Little-known Propertiesof the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index. Problemsof Translationand Specification,29 ANTIUSTBULL. 705,707 (1984) (stating
that "each HHI ... relates to a range of CR4s").
70. The 1982 Guidelines also effectively provided a safe harbor and delineated lower levels
of concentration. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § III(A)(1)(a).
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... We are fully aware of the arbitrariness of those lines and
will attempt to see them as parts of a continuum and produce
sensible results.7 1
Some wanted lower thresholds--one drafter proposed 1600,2
whereas economist George Stigler proposed 2000 to 2500. 73
The 1968 Guidelines determined the underlying market concentration using the CR4 measure and then provided some examples of
market shares for merging firms that would likely lead to a
challenge. The 1982 Guidelines used the HHI measure to determine
both the underlying concentration and the critical level of increase.
Table 1 compares the standards for merger challenge between the
guidelines. Subsequent revisions to the 1982 Guidelines have not
changed these critical thresholds.7 4

71. William F. Baxter, A Justice Department Perspective, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 287, 292
(1982).
72. See Calkins, supra note 49, at 417-18; see also Kauper, supra note 21, at 525 ("This
level [of 1800], in my judgment, is both higher than economic analysis dictates, and too great
a departure from judicially developed standards."). Thomas Kauper served as the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust during the Carter Administration.
73. Calkins, supranote 49, at 418.
74. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.1; 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
supra note 1, § 1.51.
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Table 1: Partial Comparison of 1968 and 1982
7 5 Guideline
Mergers
Horizontal
for
Thresholds
In less highly concen-

Highly
MG

concentrated
market

1968

CR4= 75%

1982

HHI-1800

In highly concentrated trated market chalmarket challenge is ... lenge is
Likely if,
4+% + 4+%, or
10+% +2+%

Likely if,
5+% + 5+%, or
25+% +1+%

Likely if,
icres >>if100
Li
HHI increase
pointsUnlikely,
points

More likely than not,
HHI
neyincrease > 100;

e.g., 7% + 7%, or

points

25% + 2%, gives approximately a 100 increase in HHI

if HHI increase < 50
pit
e.g., 5% +5% gives
approximately a 50
increase in HHI

Given that the HHI is highly responsive to disparities in relative
market shares of firms, whereas the CR4 is not, for some market
share configurations the 1982 Guidelines could be either more or
less lenient in terms of classifying a market as highly concentrated.
As discussed previously, little case law prior to the 1982 Guidelines
involved HHI measures.7 6
Hence, with respect to thresholds for merger challenges, discerning the difference between 1982 common law and the 1982 Guidelines amounts to a comparison of (1) the thresholds expressed in the
common law of the time for highly concentrated markets in terms
of CR4 and the CR4-translated HHI and (2) the market share sizes
of acquisitions likely to be challenged, again using translations from
HHI to CR4. More generally, in terms of the changes in concentration likely to trigger a challenge, the 1982 Guidelines were more
permissive of mergers than were the 1968 Guidelines. The 1982
75. This information is based on 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 5-6, and 1982
Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § III(A).
76. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
77. Based on an empirical study of market size dispersions, the DOJ noted in the 1982
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Guidelines, like their 1968 predecessor, were typically viewed as
differing from the common law.78 For example, Professor Eleanor
Fox's review of post-1968 merger cases led her to conclude that if
the government had applied the 1982 Guidelines to the six Supreme
Court merger cases after 1968, in which the Court either found the
merger illegal or likely would have found illegality, depending on
the facts found after remand, the government either would not have
sued or probably would not have sued in four cases.7"
Practically speaking, the difficulty translating from CR4s to HHIs
also weakened the impact of the pre-HHI concentration threshold
precedent. This disjunction also increased the prospect of resetting
the thresholds to increase the hurdle for bringing, and winning,
merger cases. As Stephen Calkins, former General Counsel of the
FTC, observed, if the 1982 Guidelines merely raised the thresholds
from the 1968 Guidelines,
[t]he natural tendency, especially of adjudicators, would have
been to [compare the new Guidelines' thresholds to those of the
1968 Guidelines and the case law]. Instead, adopting the HHI
offers a clean break with the past. Court decisions offer no useful
guidance as to what thresholds should raise concern, and the
literature offers little more .... The Guidelines' thresholds, for all
practical purposes, are "the only game in town."'
In PabstBrewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., the first post1982 Guidelines case to consider HHI, the court found over one
party's objections that HHI should be used rather than CR4.8 '
Guidelines that an 1800 HHI averages out to a CR4 of about 70%. The 1982 Guidelines
translate the 1968 provisions into an HHI triggering increases of about thirty-five points in
highly concentrated markets. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supranote 1, § III(A); see also Eleanor
M. Fox, The New Merger Guidelines-A Blueprintfor MicroeconomicAnalysis, 27 ANTITRUST
BULL. 519, 552-65 (1982) (extensively discussing differences between the two guidelines, and
providing general or case law examples of when the 1982 Guidelines are more lenient than
the 1968 Guidelines).
78. See Kauper, supra note 21, at 512 ("A good case can be made for the view that the
1982 Guidelines depart from contemporary judicial rulings only slightly more than the 1968
Guidelines departed from similar rulings of their time."); id. (noting that 'low-end threshold
levels" were, of course, vulnerable to the criticism that the government "is refusing to enforce
'the law").
79. Fox, supra note 77, at 590.
80. Calkins, supra note 49, at 427-28.
81. No. 88-C-078-C, 1988 WL 237452 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 19, 1988).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:771

Ironically, however, "[t]he parties apparently accepted the Guidelines' HHI thresholds as appropriate if the HHI was to be used, and
debated only whether to use adjusted or unadjusted numbers."8 2
Discussion, however, appeared to be more the exception than the
rule.83 Given the centrality of the thresholds to antitrust merger
analysis, this lack of discussion on the appropriateness of the new
thresholds is quite troubling. Over time, the general acknowledgement of the HHI-based concentration measure of the guidelines
arguably appears to have been misinterpreted as support for the
specific threshold levels.
c. SSNIP: Changing the Frame for Market Definition
The DOJ stated that "perhaps the single most important contribution" in the 1982 Guidelines was the replacement of the often "ad
hoc" determinations of market definition with a more precise
definition.' A market was now defined as "a group of products and
an associated geographic area such that (in the absence of new
entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales of
those products in that area could increase its profits through a small
but significant and non-transitory increase in price [SSNIP]."85 As
in the case with market concentration, SSNIP hinges upon a
threshold determination. With the specified 5% price increase,' this
"5% test" that provided a precise statement of an antitrust market
reflecting economic principles regarding substitution. The 1982
Guidelines also appeared to define markets more broadly than the
1968 Guidelines by not only including "market share data for
current producers (sellers)"--as did the 1968 guides-but also
including in the market "sellers who compete or potentially could
compete with the merging firm."8 "
Prior to the 1982 Guidelines, antitrust markets were defined
according to Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, which allowed for a
82. Calkins, supra note 49, at 414 (footnote omitted).
83. See id. at 427-28.
84. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 43, § 1.
85. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § II n.6.
86. See id. § IH(D).
87. E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust
Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 45-46 (1982).
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conventional market defined by "reasonable interchangeability of
use or the cross-elasticity of demand," but which also allowed
mergers to be proscribed on the basis of effects in "submarkets" that
could be identified using a number of factors, such as a "product's
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, [and] distinct prices."" Courts found submarkets
to be a convenient concept with which to find liability, whereas
commentators were frustrated by the concept's imprecision and
apparent tension with the conventional market definition.8 9
After 1982, the courts appeared to retreat from Brown Shoe and
toward more economics-based views of market definition. Though
the evidence of influence on this guideline change is less direct than
that discussed regarding HHIs, considerable indirect evidence of
influence exists. Werden, for example, identifies many post-1982
cases in which the guidelines approach was applied or cited
approvingly, as well as cases in which the courts referred to other
related approaches in the scholarly literature that were relatively
inhospitable to the idea of submarkets. 90 In contrast, Werden also
finds very few pre-1982 rulings that argued against submarkets
using economics arguments consistent with what became the
guidelines approach. 91 He concluded that "market delineation since
the [1982] Guidelines bears little resemblance to that of the prior
two decades."92
While SSNIP arguably contributed to a change in the law
regarding market definition, courts adopted SSNIP more slowly

88. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
89. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise
of Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 206-07 (2000); Gregory J. Werden, The History of
Antitrust Market Delineation,76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 160-61 (1992).
90. See Werden, supra note 89, at 205-08.
91. Werden carefully delineates that even among those courts that have continued to cite
to Brown Shoe's "practical indicia" for submarkets, these same courts "have cited them
without actually applying them." Id. at 205. Werden further notes that a number of other
courts "have held that the practical indicia are merely 'evidentiary proxies for direct proof of
substitutability." Id. (quoting H.J., Inc. v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir.
1989); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
Yet another court has held that -[t]he use of the term 'submarket' is to be avoided; it adds
only confusion to an already imprecise and complex endeavor."' Id. at 206 (quoting Satellite
Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Contl Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1983)).
92. Id. at 205.
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than they did the HHIs. A primary problem with SSNIP was its
workability. SSNIP has been criticized as an illustration of how
economics has elevated theory over practice in some parts of merger
law.93 But despite the problems that the courts and the DOJ may
have had actually deploying SSNIP, it remained DOJ's formal policy
for merger analysis.9 4 This policy contributed to the concept's
persistence despite a lukewarm reception by the courts. Continued
use gave the concept time to mature and time for methods of
implementation to be developed.
3. 1992 Merger Guidelines
The next major revision to the merger guidelines occurred in
1992. 9" This revision also marked the first time the DOJ and FTC
issued joint guidelines. Prior iterations of the guidelines worked to
refine and revise the common law at the time of their issuance. The
1992 Guidelines revealed the potential of guidelines to reject the
prevailing common law and, nonetheless, later become incorporated
into that law.
a. Entry
Especially since GeneralDynamics,' the courts were increasingly
willing to allow market concentration evidence to be tempered by
other factors-for example, factors that make collusion more

93. See id. at 200; see also Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 579 (10th
Cir. 1985) ("[OQn the issue of market definition, a decision based on [the] Guidelines remains
as inexact as the data gathered to make the assessment. Market definition is by its nature
an imprecise task. The Justice Department's recent revisions of the 1982 market definition
standards, only strengthen our conviction that these guidelines are more useful for setting
prosecutorial policy than delineating judicial standards.").
94. Antitrust Division's Chief Economist Defends Value of New Merger Guidelines, 42
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1072, at 1302 (June 24, 1982). "The kind of economic
analysis required by the Justice Department's new merger guidelines has been accomplished
only three times within the Antitrust Division, according to Lawrence J. White, the Division's
chief economist." Id. White, however, "declined to name the three matters." Id. at 1304. He
"recogniz[ed] the difficulties in obtaining the proper evidence, [and] conceded that there often
will not be definitive answers. But [White] stressed: 'I think this is going to encourage us and
the private sector to be looking a lot harder for econometric evidence. Id.
95. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1.
96. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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difficult-and by a small number of defenses.97 The most important
of these defenses has been entry. Easy entry, it is argued, undercuts
the potential anticompetitive effects associated with significant
increases in market concentration. Despite widespread agreement
that entry was germane for determining if a merger would be
anticompetitive, the best way to assess entry and to incorporate it
into the analysis was unclear as reflected in the differing approaches to its treatment in subsequent years.
The 1982 Guidelines recognized entry but provided little elaboration on how to implement the entry defense. 8 In the late 1980s, the
DOJ focused on whether entry would occur rather than could
occur.9 9 In United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., the DOJ argued that
entry "can rebut a prima facie case only by a clear showing that
10 0
entry into the market by competitors would be quick and effective."'
The D.C. Circuit unequivocally rejected the proposed standard,
stating "[wle find no merit in the legal standard propounded by the
government. It is devoid of support in the statute, in the case law,
and in the government's own [1982] Merger Guidelines." 10 ' The
court elaborated further upon the "fundamental" flaws in the DOJ's
position, noting that it places an "onerous burden [on the defendant]
of proving that entry will be 'quick and effective,"' and that, by
requiring "a clear showing, the standard in effect shifts the government's ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant."'' 2
97. James T. Halverson, Report to the House of Delegates on Proposed Amendments to
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 673, 684 (1986) ("Subsequent lower court and
FTC merger decisions have viewed General Dynamics as a point of departure for looking
beyond market share and concentration levels to more particularized economic evidence
bearing on competitive effect, resulting in more informed and better decisions."). Such
evidence includes the existence of "entry barriers," "potential entry by new firms," and
"expanded entry by existing firms." Id.
98. The 1982 Merger Guidelines assessed "[e]ase of [e]ntry" for horizontal mergers by
considering "the likelihood and probable magnitude of entry in response to a small but
significant and non-transitory increase in price," here five percent. 1982 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 1, § III(B). A two-year time frame was used. Id. As one commentator observed,
"[tihe most curious feature of this provision is that, having indicated the method for
determining 'how much' entry is likely to occur, there is no indication of 'how much' is
necessary to prevent competitors from raising prices." Kauper, supranote 21, at 514-15.
99. Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry
in MergerAnalysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 363 (1997).
100. 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Yet the 1992 Guidelines provide that entry is "easy" if it could be
"timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character and scope
to deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern. In markets
where entry is that easy (i.e., where entry passes these tests of
timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency), the merger raises no
1 3 As
antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis.""
William Blumenthal, currently General Counsel of the FTC,
observed shortly after the 1992 Guidelines were issued:
There is substantial question as to whether the 1992 Guidelines are consistent with the case law that has evolved with
respect to entry. 'Timely" is not precisely the same as "quick,"
and "sufficient" is not precisely the same as "effective," but the
Guidelines are similar to (perhaps indistinguishable from?) the
government position that was rejected by the court in Baker
Hughes."o
In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
quoted the guidelines' entry standard with approval, albeit within
a different antitrust context. 10 5 Somewhat ironic was the endorsement of the District Court for the District of Columbia of the
"timely, likely, sufficient" standard within the section 7 context in
1998. In FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., the court explained the
importance of entry as "one way in which post-merger pricing
practices can be forced back down to competitive levels."'1 6 The court
then proceeded to quote the 1992 Guideline standard of "timely,
likely and sufficient" and observed that "[t]he Court of Appeals for
this Circuit affirmed the use of ease of entry analysis in United
States v. Baker Hughes."' v
In sum, the federal government revised its entry guideline in
response to the series of losses it suffered owing, in part, to its entry
analysis. Yet, the antitrust agencies adopted a guideline standard
103. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.0.
104. William Blumenthal, Thirty-oneMerger Policy Questions Still LingeringAfterthe 1992
Guidelines, 38 ANTITRUST BuLL. 593, 632 (1993); see supra notes 102-03 and accompanying
text.
105. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995) (concerning a
section 2 action under the Sherman Act for attempted monopolization).
106. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
107. Id.; see supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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that, on its face, was extremely close to the standard the circuit
court had rejected. This newly packaged guideline standard,
containing arguments very similar to those previously rejected, then
was met with judicial approval.
b. Treatment of ProductionSubstitution and Entry
One issue with which both the 1982 and 1992 Guidelines
grappled was distinguishing between existing supply and entry. For
example, an existing supplier might have existing capacity that is
not currently producing the product in question, but could quickly
be converted to do so. Should this capacity be counted in determining market concentration or as potential entry? The 1992 Guidelines
consider such capacity, or "uncommitted" entry, when determining
market concentration, if the supply conversion could be accomplished within one year without significant sunk costs." 8 This
categorization was not as innocuous as it may have seemed. As
Professor Louis Schwartz aptly explained,
Potential diversion of productive capacity ...
has generally
been evaluated by examining the condition of entry rather than
by manipulating the market share calculation....
Logically, it ought to make no difference whether the
decisionmaker bases his decision on a higher market share
discounted by ease of entry or a lower market share calculated
by treating potential entrants as already in the market. Practically and rhetorically,however, a significantadvantagehas been
given to defendants, and departmental discretion has been
reinforced....
...
An agency strategy that can have the effect of lowering
nominal market shares will combine nicely with conventional
judicial benchmarks of "excessive" concentration to ease the path
to mergers. 10 9
The treatment of committed and uncommitted entry underscores
a significant, potentially insidious aspect of any decision framework
108. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supranote 1, § 1.32.
109. Louis B. Schwartz, The New MergerGuidelines:Guide to GovernmentalDiscretionand
Private Counseling or Propagandafor Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 575,
586-87 (1983) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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that involves breaking a decision into parts and sequencing the
analysis of those parts. Categorizing decisions can alter the ultimate
decision once the categories are treated differently, as in the case of
entry, or once a decision has been made in one category, if some of
the nuances associated with that decision are not accounted for in
subsequent decisions.11 For example, once a market has been
defined, weaknesses in the definition are likely to be given less
weight in subsequent decisions that rely on the market definition.
B. Evidence of Overall Influence of the Merger Guidelines
This Section supplements the case studies with some basic
quantitative measures regarding judicial reference and reliance on
the merger guidelines over time. An analysis of all rulings from
1968 to 2003 concerning section 7 of the Clayton Act further
supports what the case studies revealed."' The guidelines have
profoundly influenced antitrust law's evolution." 2 One basic index
of influence is whether courts mentioned the guidelines in rulings
or, more importantly, relied on them despite the guidelines' lack of
precedential authority. Between 1970 and 1975, the average rate at
which judges referenced the guidelines was approximately 12.5%.
By the mid-1980s, the reference rate was typically above 50%. An
110. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES, 241, 243 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (noting that "mental
accounting" used in sequential decision making leads to nonneutral decision rules).
111. I constructed a dataset of all Clayton Act section 7 rulings from 1969-2003 through
a two-step process. First, I compiled a list of all merger-related rulings. The primary source
used to locate those rulings issued through 1981 was the MERGER CASE DIGEST published by
the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law. See generally SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, 1971 MERGER CASE DIGEST; SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASs'N,
1976 MERGER CASE DIGEST; SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR AS'N, 1982 MERGER CASE
DIGEST. From the early 1980s through 2003, the primary source used to locate federal court
rulings was Trade Cases, which is published on an annual basis. Rulings by the FTC and the
FTC's AIJs are available through the FTC library on Westlaw. My review of those sources
was informed by several publicly available reports issued by the FTC and the DOJ, many of
which are available online. See generallyFTC Annual Reports, www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2006) (listing annual FTC reports from 1916 to 2006). Second, I retained
only those rulings substantively addressing section 7 issues. As such, I excluded private cases
solely addressing issues of standing and government cases solely addressing jurisdictional
issues. Rulings involving government consent agreements were also excluded.
112. Unless otherwise indicated, "decisions" include rulings by not only Article III judges,
but also by the FTC's ALJs, and by the Commission functioning in an adjudicatory capacity.
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examination of the degree to which judges substantively relied on
the guidelines in their rulings reveals a similar pattern. In the early
1970s the references were not particularly positive or extensive. By
the mid-1970s, however, courts evinced an increasing need to at
least grapple with inconsistencies between their view and the
guidelines, and by the mid-1980s courts used the guidelines in an
increasingly extensive and positive manner. The remainder of this
Section presents basic statistical data regarding guideline references in judicial decisions. The next Section will present basic
statistical data regarding the substantive nature of the courts'
reliance on the guidelines.'1 3
The starting point for gauging guideline influence on judicial
decision making is identifying the number of rulings that reference
the merger guidelines in any given year. The number of such section
7 rulings showed modest year-to-year variability.1 For the years
1969 to 2003, therefore, I determined both the absolute number of
rulings that referenced the guidelines' as well as the rate at which
section 7 rulings referenced the guidelines.1 6 This time frame
begins almost immediately after the adoption of the 1968 Guidelines
broadand includes ten years of experience under the most recent
7
1992.1
in
occurred
that
guidelines
the
of
scale revision

113. See infra Part II.C.
114. The number of cases brought by the government that resulted in section 7 rulings
declined substantially beginning in 1979 and through the mid-1980s. The inception of this
decline roughly corresponds to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(HSR) Act that became effective in 1978. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
115. See infra Graph 1.
116. See infra Graph 2. I excluded rulings in private cases solely involving issues of
standing and government cases involving solely jurisdictional issues from this tabulation.
117. The 1992 Guidelines were revised in 1997. The revision included an expanded
efficiency section. Unless otherwise indicated, references to the 1992 Guidelines include the
1997 changes.
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Graph 1: Number of Section 7 Rulings
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Graph 2 illustrates that the rate of reference to the guidelines rose
modestly during the 1970s from typically between 10-15% in the
early 1970s to between 15-20% in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
During this period the 1968 Guidelines were in effect. In 1983,
shortly after the 1982 Guidelines were issued, the reference rate
increased to above 50% and by the late 1980s averaged 60% or
somewhat higher. Stated alternatively, the courts increasingly
referenced the 1968 Guidelines from their inception through 1982.
After the 1982 Guidelines were issued, merger guidelines quickly
became a basic reference point in section 7 rulings." 8

118. The rate of merger guideline references could depend in part on whether the merger
in question was primarily horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. To assess this possibility, I
removed from my data all section 7 rulings that were purely vertical, conglomerate, or
contained only vertical and conglomerate dimensions. I then recalculated the overall rate of
merger guideline references in three-year blocks beginning with 1969-1971 and ending with
1984-1986. The sample without those rulings produced rates comparable to the corresponding
larger sample rates.
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Graph 2: Rate of Merger Guidelines References
by Ruling
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The data reveal several other important trends. First, the issuance
of the 1968 Guidelines led to experimentation. This experimentation
appears as an initial spike of merger guideline references in 1969,
both in higher absolute number and rate. Second, although the
guidelines were issued by the DOJ without official approval by the
FTC, the FTC rulings mention the merger guidelines more frequently, a fact that holds true for both the 1968 and the 1982
Guidelines.119 One reason this may have occurred was that the FTC
commissioners who used the guidelines to help with prosecutorial
decisions were more familiar with the guidelines in their
adjudicatory role than were Article III judges. Finally, except for the
initial increase in 1969, the number and rate of references to the
merger guidelines in private-plaintiff cases was essentially zero
until the mid-1970s.12° Thus, the increase in references in the later
1970s was partially attributable to more references in these private
cases.

119. See infra Graph 3.
120. See supraGraphs 1-2.
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Graph 3: Comparative Rate of Merger Guideline
References
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C. Reliance on Guidelines Within Reported and Unreported
Decisions
Merely tallying guideline references may obscure actual guideline
influence if the rulings' substantive reliance varied greatly.
Therefore, I categorized each court's opinion during the early years
of the guidelines in terms of the nature and extent of the reliance on
the guidelines ("reliance factor"). The results illustrate the courts'
broadly increasing reliance upon the guidelines over time.'
The "reliance factor" is a hybrid of subjective and objective
features of guidelines' role within section 7 rulings. I classified each
ruling into one of six categories; each category represents a distinct
form of judicial reliance on the guidelines. The categories designate
increasing degrees by which the opinion uses or cites the guidelines
positively.

121. See infra Table 2.
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Rejection (negative):
Guidelines were discussed but rejected in
122
the ruling.

Reconciliation (negative): Discussion of the guidelines in the
reconciliation category typically took the form of justifying an
implicit rejection or asserting a23lack of inconsistency between
the opinion and the guidelines.

Recognition (neutral): The guidelines were mentioned or
described in terms of their express content or as an argument of
one party without any further analysis or application.'24
Support (positive): A ruling in this category cited or discussed
the guidelines positively, but had an independent grounding
apart from the merger guidelines.'25
Reliance in the Alternative (positive): Such rulings relied on the
guidelines to make an argument in the alternative,
but the
126
guidelines are not integral to the outcome.
Reliance (positive): In this category, the merger guidelines were
integral to the outcome. The ruling typically relied on the
merger guidelines as the sole basis, or as the lead basis with
1 27
multiple sources, for critical elements supporting the ruling.
Table 2 summarizes my findings on the relative reliance on
merger guidelines from 1968 to 1985, which is the primary period
for the growth of guideline influence. For presentational purposes,
I count the number of rulings in three-year groupings. Rulings
exhibiting two distinct types of reliance are given a count of one half
in each category. Though this exercise should be interpreted
cautiously, the results reinforce the impression given by the raw
numbers and rates discussed previously. 2 '

122. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Technical Indus., Inc., No. 73-246, 1974 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12922, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 1974).
123. See, e.g., Varney v. Coleman Co., 385 F. Supp. 1337 (D.N.H. 1974).
124. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
125. See, e.g., Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del.
1969).
126. See, e.g., F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817 & n.5
(2d Cir. 1979).
127. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009, 1020-21
(N.D. Ohio 1985), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir.
1986).
128. See supra Graphs 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Relative Reliance on Merger Guidelines 1968-1985
(number of rulings referencing merger guidelines)
68-70

71-73

77-79

80-82

83-85

Rejection
Reconciliation

1
0

1
0

1
1

0
1

0
0

1
0

Recognition

3.5

4

3

4

1

3

Support

2.5

2

2

3.5

3

11

Reliance (in alt)
Reliance

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2.5

2

7

•74-76

The basic message is that the judiciary's reliance on the guidelines was increasingly frequent and increasingly positive. From
1968 to 1985, a clear progression existed wherein the initial reliance
was primarily neutral or questioning-both of which demonstrate
recognition of the merger guidelines themselves or parties' arguments regarding them-and later the reliance became more clearly
positive. The initial period of relatively high reference rates coupled
with less substantive reliance suggested an initial phase characterized by experimentation.
The mid-to-late 1970s witnessed both an increase in the overall
reliance on the guidelines as well as several instances of rejection
and reconciliation. On its face, this pattern might have seemed
somewhat inconsistent with the hypothesis of the 1968 Guidelines'
increasing influence. But increased negative discussion of the
guidelines likely indicated increased rather than decreased
influence after one accounted for the courts' incentives to discuss the
guidelines. When the guidelines were not viewed as established or
legally important, the courts did not need to account for them. The
relative lack of reconciliation rulings in the first six years may have
reflected that courts felt no need to discuss differences between
their rulings and "guideline-based" rulings. As the guidelines'
prominence increased, however, courts that disagreed with the
guidelines arguably felt compelled to address these differences.' 29
129. Several important legislative actions during this period (1968-1985) arguably
increased the influence of the federal government. The most important development was that
HSR substantially altered the antitrust agencies' institutional role, greatly increasing the
government's ability to challenge mergers before consummation. This law shifted the dynamic
of when and by whom mergers were challenged and gave additional power to the agencies. See
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The 1982 Guidelines were issued in mid-1982.,'
Both the
reference count and the reliance measure revealed a strong upsurge
in influence after the new guidelines were introduced. Comparing
the relative number of positive versus negative/neutral references
for a few years following each guidelines' issuance is telling. From
1968 to 1970, three out of seven rulir gs were positive. From 1983 to
1985, eighteen out of twenty-two rulings were positive, with nearly
one-third showing some level of reliance.
The increase in reference and reliance post-1982 is quite dramatic. Part of the explanation stems from GeneralDynamics, which
created an additional need for guidance,' 3 ' and the subsequent
13 2
absence of Supreme Court precedent after the mid-1970s.
Additionally, within the DOJ the 1982 Guidelines were much more
heavily relied on than were the 1968 Guidelines. Finally, it is
possible that the courts increased the level of deference to the 1982
Guidelines in part because the guidelines were a (more) recent
statement of the agency's expert knowledge, and in part because the
FTC explicitly expressed generalized support for the DOJ guidelines
in their 1982 Merger Statement.
III. GUIDELINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION: A THEORY REGARDING
GUIDELINE REFERENCE AND RELIANCE

Part III provides both case study and statistical support for the
proposition that the antitrust merger guidelines' influence has
grown significantly over time despite their nonbinding character
and their express purpose of merely illuminating the use of
prosecutorial discretion. In this Part, I provide a theory of guideline
institutionalization to account for this increasing influence and
describe several specific mechanisms through which this influence
process becomes manifest.

supra note 114.
130. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1 (issued on June 14, 1982).
131. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); see, e.g., Donald G. Kempf,
Jr., Merger Litigation from the Birth of General Dynamics to the Death of Section 7, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 653, 657 & n.19 (1997) (declaring General Dynamics "a watershed" that
"reversed abruptly the course of a Court that appeared to many to be on the verge of
implementing a per se rule against horizontal mergers").
132. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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A. A Theory of GuidelineInfluence Through Institutionalization
Given that the guidelines are only the antitrust agencies'
statements of their enforcement policies and that they are technically nonbinding, what accounts for their influence? The history of
the guidelines described previously' 3 3 provides many important
clues. In this Section, I apply the concept of "institutionalization" to
the guidelines to explain that influence. This entails introducing the
concept and then selectively recapping the relevant evidence as
discussed in Part II.
In the sociology literature, an organization or rule becomes
institutionalized when it is "infus[ed] with value beyond the
technical requirements of the task at hand."'34 I modify this general
definition to fit the guideline context: guidelines become "institutionalized" when they gain sufficient stature that they become valued
in legal arguments by the courts and others, beyond the persuasive
power of the ideas they embody. The concept of institutionalization
is a useful lens through which to view guidelines.
To gain a clearer understanding of what I mean by institutionalization, consider the Hippocratic Oath, which can be thought
of as a guideline for physician conduct. Despite the fact that the
Hippocratic Oath had no formal status in the courtroom (that is, as
precedent), even the Supreme Court felt compelled to reconcile its
seminal ruling in Roe v. Wade'3 5 with the oath. In Roe, the Supreme
Court explicitly addressed the significance of the Hippocratic Oath,

133. See supra Part II.A.
134. This definition is based on Philip Selznick's definition of "institutionalization" within
the context of organizations. Philip Selznick, Institutionalism"Old"and"New,"41 ADMIN. SCI.
is infusion
Q. 270, 271 (1996) (noting that institutionalization's "most significant' aspect ...
with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand'); see PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA
AND THE GRASS RooTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION 256-57 (Harper
& Row 1966) (1949). Several of Selznick's observations resonate strongly within this merger
context. First, Selznick argues that "[m]onitoring the process of institutionalization-its costs
as well as benefits-is a major responsibility [for society]." Selzick, Institutionalism "Old"
nstitutionalization constrains conduct in two main Ways:
and "New,"supra,at 271. Second, "fi]
by bringing it within a normative order, and by making it hostage to its own history." Id.; see
also John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:Formal Structure as
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977) (discussing rules and processes as
institutions).
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2006]

GUIDELINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

811

which prohibited abortion.' 6 After a fairly extensive discussion
of abortion in ancient Greece, the Court concluded that the Oath
reflected "only a small segment of Greek opinion and that it
certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians."'37 Through
its somewhat oxymoronic characterization of the Oath as "a
long-accepted and revered statement of medical ethics,"13 the
Court thereby reconciled its ruling (permitting abortion) with the
Oath (prohibiting abortion). The Court's considerable (and legally
unnecessary) efforts to reconcile its ruling with the Oath was even
more remarkable given that neither principal brief raised the
issue. 3 9 These efforts reflected the Oath's power as an institution
that transcended its actual content and authority.
Much like the Hippocratic Oath for physician conduct, the merger
guidelines have gained special status in the antitrust debate. As
this status evolved-that is, as the guidelines became a stronger
general antitrust institution-the guidelines became increasingly
influential by refraining the terms of proper antitrust merger
analysis and by anchoring important inquiries.
When first introduced, the guidelines had limited authority
outside the DOJ and even within the DOJ itself."' Over time, the
"legitimacy" of the guidelines increased, and even when that
legitimacy had not been fully established, the statistics above
revealed an increased tendency among decision makers to explain
or reconcile rulings with the guidelines.' The reputation of the
guidelines, with respect to the soundness of their ideas, concurrently grew, and this, too, enhanced their status. By the mid-1980s,
the guidelines were cited heavily in antitrust rulings.' Increased
judicial recognition moved the law closer to the guidelines, further
enabling the courts to accord still greater weight to the guidelines.
By the early 1990s, we even find an instance when a theory of entry,
arguably rejected two years earlier, appeared in a new revision of

136. See id. at 130-32 (citing Dr. Ludwig Edelstein).
137. Id. at 132.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 131.
140. See SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION To PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 135 (1977).
141. See supraPart II.B.
142. See supra Graphs 2-3 and accompanying text.
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the guidelines that the courts then adopted. 14 1 In sum, each
successive version of the guidelines moves the law towards it, and
the strength of the "gravitational force"' that the guidelines exert
changes over time.
This merger guideline history shows increasing levels of influence
with an ongoing evolution of the relationship between the law and
the guidelines. The history is not merely the result of the acceptance
of superior ideas-though the appeal and soundness of the underlying ideas does matter-nor does the increase seem consistent with
a simple story of (possibly unwarranted) judicial deference to agency
promulgations. Rather, I believe that something more is needed to
explain the history. The guidelines themselves became legitimized
and valued beyond the content of their ideas. The antitrust guidelines had acquired a power to influence the law because they were
the antitrust guidelines, and not just because they were good ideas
or the pronouncements of expert federal agencies. By the 1990s, the
guidelines had developed their own special identity. Ideas contained
in the guidelines might even prevail in law against otherwise
superior competing ideas. In short, the antitrust guidelines had
become a strong institution.
Institutionalization occurs both with respect to specific guideline
elements and with respect to the overarching approach and
framework that integrates the individual elements. The institutionalization of the individual elements and the guidelines collectively reinforce one another: the legitimacy of the elements enhances the status of the set of guidelines, and the legitimacy of the
guidelines enhances the likelihood that concepts introduced in
guideline revisions are received more favorably than they otherwise
might have been. The ability of any particular guideline version to
sway judge-made law depends not only on the guideline in effect but
also on the influence of its predecessors. The startlingly quick
adoption of many of the 1982 Guideline ideas was based in part on
the status of the 1968 Guidelines even when the ideas that were
143. See supra Part II.A.3.a.
144. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977). Dworkin uses the term
"gravitational force" to describe the influence of earlier decisions on those that follow "even
when these later decisions lie outside [the earlier decisions] particular orbit." Id.; Hillary
Greene, Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in NoncriminalLitigation, 16 YALE L. & POLY REv. 169, 170 n.7 (1997).
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adopted, such as the HHI, were relatively novel. Thus, the evolution
of the guideline influence is cumulative and self-reinforcing.1 45
Once institutionalized, the underlying analytical approach may
frame the debate about other concepts or even constrain the
emergence of an alternative, potentially superior analysis for the
particular case at hand. An idea's inclusion within such an institution confers upon it substantial, arguably excessive weight. In its
most extreme form, courts may embrace ideas that they had
previously, and often recently, rejected.146 Moreover, the guideline
approach may become dominant even though it may be no better
than a number of other alternative approaches and could conceivably be worse.
B. Mechanisms of Institutionalization
This Section describes the primary factors that nurtured,
promoted and sustained the process of merger guideline institutionalization. The first factor was a relative lack of controlling
authority in antitrust merger law. Lack of controlling authority
meant that the courts did not have a definitive articulation of
merger analysis and, therefore, were more likely to search for help
outside of established authorities. One can view this factor as a
precondition for influence. Second, the guidelines offered exactly the
type of comprehensive and user-friendly system of merger analysis
that the courts desired. Third, the guidelines were given a presumptive credibility because they were authored by a government expert
agency to which some judicial deference was owed. Finally, guideline influence further increased as the underlying structure and
principles in the guidelines increasingly became the frame through
which both the courts and the litigants viewed antitrust merger
analysis. Below I discuss these factors and how they contributed to
the increasing institutionalization of the merger guidelines.

145. In my guideline institutionalization theory, the guidelines have a status separate from
the status accorded to the agency (or agencies) that authored the guidelines. See infra Part
III.B.3 for a discussion of how deference to the authoring agency affects guideline status.
146. See infra Part III.C.
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1. Demand for Guidance: The Relative Lack of Controlling
Authority
The vague and open-ended character of key antitrust statutes
increases potential guideline influence, because the discretionary
sphere available to the courts is substantial. 147 Actual guideline
influence, however, also reflects how the common law landscape has
developed. This depends, in part, upon the rudimentary issue of how
frequently the courts hear merger cases. As will be discussed below,
in the years since the first merger guidelines were issued, courts
have decided decreasing percentages of merger cases. Decreased
numbers of rulings-and the corresponding decrease in precedentprovided an increased opportunity for the merger guidelines to
shape the law.
The lack of definitive case law reflects a marked decrease in the
number of merger cases the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed. The
Supreme Court issued a number of critical merger decisions in the
1960s, and several more important decisions in the 1970s, but has
issued no additional rulings in the subsequent decades. At least one
contributing factor to this "sound of silence ' 141 was the enactment
of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (APPA), 4 9 which
essentially eliminated a previously available direct appeal channel
from the district courts to the Supreme Court. 5 '
In addition to a decrease in Supreme Court rulings, the overall
number of section 7 rulings also has decreased since the mid-1970s.
Enactment of HSR 5 ' contributed substantially to this decrease.
Sims and Herman reported that the rate of district court litigation
resulting from agency merger challenges decreased from 50% before

147. See supra Part I.A.
148. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 439-41 (2002).
149. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (2000).
150. See Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, Recent Reforms in the Federal Judicial
Structure-Three-Judge District Courts and Appellate Review, 67 F.R.D. 135, 135 (1975)
(noting that the APPA "virtually eliminated the hitherto-existing direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from final district court judgments in any Expediting Act case" and, therefore,
reduced the likelihood of the Supreme Court ruling on any given merger case).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000); see supra note 114. HSR requires those intending to merge to
notify the federal agencies of their intention. A waiting period ensues to permit federal
evaluation and, if necessary, challenge to the merger preconsummation. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
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HSR to 22% after HSR.'52 Moreover, it has been argued that "[t]he
inevitable by-product of the 1982 Merger Guidelines is that fewer
and fewer cases go to litigation. With the higher market share
thresholds, firms seeking to enter into troublesome mergers ... often
settle[] before [the] complaint is filed."' 3 Additionally, changes in
standing requirements decreased the ability of private parties to
institute merger actions.' Milton Handler highlighted this lack of
judicial guidance when he observed that "with possibly one or two
exceptions," the approximately thirty Supreme Court opinions and
pre-1980 rulings of lower courts cannot "be taken at face value."'5 5
The guidelines offered the agencies and the courts a tool to navigate
this open legal terrain.'5 6
Though the amount of judicial guidance arguably decreased
during the late 1970s and 1980s, the demand for such guidance
likely increased both in response to changing economic understandings and the General Dynamics'5 7 ruling that opened the door for
additional economic analysis without providing limits or guideposts
for its incorporation.' 5 8 At a minimum, it appeared that a court
confronting a myriad of economic arguments lacked a core set of
merger decisions with which to deal with those issues.

152. See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino
on Merger Practice:A Case Study in the Law of UnintendedConsequencesApplied to Antitrust
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 866 (1997).
153. David A. Clanton, Recent Merger Developments: Coming of Age Under the Guidelines,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 345, 355 (1984).
154. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases:Reconciling
PrivateIncentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (discussing the
"vital problem of private antitrust enforcement - the standing of private merger litigants").
155. Milton Handler, Essay, The Dilemma of the Antitrust Practitioner,22 Sw. U. L. REV.
393, 393 (1993).
156. Handler also attributed one's inability to merely rely on ostensibly valid precedent,
in part, to the "reformulating [ofn the law through the issuance of guidelines." Id.
157. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
158. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 39, at 37 ("From both a legal standpoint and an
economic standpoint, litigants [after General Dynamics] may need to contend with a variety
of refined predictive evidence considered subordinate or irrelevant under the traditional
approach to horizontal merger analysis."); Note, Horizontal MergersAfter United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 92 HARV. L. REV. 491,512 (1978) (arguing that the lower courts used
this case to justify a wide range of broadened inquiries and demonstrated "no precise bounds
to" its use).
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2. User-friendly Guidance: The Attractiveness of the Guidelines
Package
Judicial attraction to agency guidelines was, of course, due partly
to the appeal of the individual ideas. Yet, as the concentration
measurement debate (HHI vs. CR4) demonstrated,159 the clear
substantive superiority of the guideline-endorsed measure did not
appear to fuel the swift judicial acceptance. Arguably, acceptance
came largely because the ideas were contained in a user-friendly
package that a federal agency endorsed. Before examining the key
role that deference to the agencies played in the acceptance of the
guidelines, I note several guidelines features that facilitated judicial
reliance.
a. Comprehensive and Convenient
An extremely valuable feature of the merger guidelines, from the
courts' viewpoint, is that they are a practical framework specifically
designed to support antitrust merger decision making. This
framework, unlike any developed by an individual court, benefits
from the relatively huge and extensive case-by-case experience of
the federal agencies. Additionally, the guidelines attempt not only
to articulate general principles that can be applied to specific fact
situations, but also to be relatively comprehensive. Thus, for any
given fact situation the guidelines typically provide some level of
guidance.
b. Economic Framework
From the mid-1960s onward, society's economic understanding of
markets progressed considerably, and a corresponding trend
emerged towards incorporating more economics into antitrust law.
'The 1968 Guidelines were carefully drawn to incorporate the
economic thinking of the time ....
,",The same was true of the 1982

Guidelines, to such extent that they "read, in places, more like a
chapter in an industrial organization economics treatise than a
159. See supra Part II.A.2.a-b.
160. Kauper, supra note 21,at 498.
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simple set of guiding principles."'' In 1992, two principal authors
of the revised guidelines stated the dual purpose of the new policy
document was "to clarify enforcement policy and 'get the economics
right." 6 2 This general trend resulted in, among other things, a
decrease in the use of per se-type rules in merger actions. 1 3 This, in
turn, increased the potential role, if not outright need, for guidelines
to meet the demand for analytical economics-based frameworks.
The trend of increasing reliance on economics was not, however,
without its critics. In 1985, Commissioner Patricia Bailey wrote in
dissent from an FTC ruling: 'The Commission has charted a new
course away from the great body of the traditional caselaw, and
indeed abandoned the assumptions that have attended merger
enforcement policy of both old and recent vintage, substituting a
well-nigh theological-and surely theoretical-economic deus ex
machina."' Ironically, in the same dissent Bailey also criticized the
FTC for failing to meaningfully apply their 1982 Statement and the
DOJ's 1982 Guidelines.'6 5 As the economic approach to merger law
became more widely accepted by judges and the legal community,
the guidelines (as one part of this trend) gained additional currency.
3. Deference to the FederalAgencies
Compared to other sources interpreting merger law, the guidelines' relative influence was enhanced by the unique status of their
authors and the considerable judicial deference they received. This
subsection explores the contours of that arguably excessive deference.
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
various "rulings, interpretations, and opinions" of an agency, "while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
161. Id. at 508.
162. David T. Scheffman, Introduction [toSymposium on New 1992 Merger Guidelines], 38
ANTITRUST BULL. 473 (1993) (citing Assistant Attorney General James Rill and Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Robert Willig).
163. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Antitrust Ecomonics-Making Progress,Avoiding Regression,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163, 165 (2003) (noting "the upsurge of antitrust economics has gone
hand-in-hand with the abandonment of most per se rules").
164. Echlin Manuf. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 1985 WL 668902, at *22 (Patricia P. Bailey,
Comm'r, dissenting).
165. See id. at **20-22.
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constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' 6 Under
Skidmore, the courts could properly accord some level of influence to
the merger guidelines as statements of a federal agency's enforcement policy. The standard in Skidmore was the nebulous "power to
persuade,"'6 7 with the standard for "persuasion" being largely
discretionary.'6 8 Because Skidmore and its progeny did not delineate
a reasonably constrained range of deference, they cannot be
interpreted as prescribing the actual level of influence owed the
guidelines.
In the intervening decades since Skidmore, Supreme Court rulings
frequently strengthened the level of deference owed administrative
agencies. In its seminal ruling, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court held that judges must
defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute if it
was reasonable and embodied in a legislative rule.'6 9 Chevron
established a much greater level of deference than did Skidmore.
"Chevron deference," however, applies largely within the context of
rulemaking, a context that does not apply to expressly nonbinding
enforcement policies like the guidelines.17 °
On the most basic level, one would expect rulings invoking the
merger guidelines to include some discussion of the level of deference
actually accorded the guidelines. In fact, shortly after their introduction in the late 1960s, a few courts explicitly considered the merger
guidelines' appropriate role in judicial decision making. The clearest
assessment ofjudicial deference to such guidelines occurred in AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,
166. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
167. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 846
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 855.
169. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). In essence, "[agency] interpretations entitled to Chevron
deference must take the form ...
of legislative rulemaking or binding adjudication." Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 167, at 837. Guidelines, as nonbinding enforcement policies, do not
command Chevron deference. Therefore, to the extent that the courts discuss whether
guidelines warrant deference, it is treated as a fully discretionary, rather than mandatory,
decision. Id.; see infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the viability of rulemaking as an option).
170. None of the merger guidelines were promulgated under a grant of rule-making
authority, and only recently have some guidelines been promulgated in a process consistent
with the APA. In fact, the guidelines were frequently promulgated with no adherence to rulelike procedures such as public notice and comment.
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Inc., 7 ' which arose shortly after the DOJ introduced its 1968
Guidelines. After the district court denied the preliminary injunction
sought by the target of a takeover,'7 2 the Third Circuit reversed and
stated that the merger at issue was "very likely to have anticompetitive effects in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act," recognizing
the guidelines were not binding on it but nevertheless considering
the DOJ's "position as entitled to some consideration, particularly
when elements of the Guidelines find support in the developing case
law."17 The majority opinion devoted a separate section to discussion
of the guidelines. 174 By contrast, the dissent assiduously avoided any
reference to the guidelines and denounced "the theories advanced [by
the majority] on potential entry, product extension, and reciprocity
to be devoid of precedental support or endorsement by any
recognized commentator." 17 In its appeal to the Supreme Court,
White Consolidated argued that "this complex case leaves unresolved fundamental questions raised in the major reversing and
the judicial sanction to be given the
dissenting opinions as to ...
Justice Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines."'76 The petition for
certiorari was denied,' 77 and the precise role of the antitrust
guidelines continued to defy easy assessment.
Since that time, most court rulings on section 7 matters have not
directly addressed the issue of deference to the guidelines. 78 Among
courts that have explicitly addressed the issue, their treatment of
the legal standard of deference to guidelines has been relatively
1 79
constant, even with broader changes in administrative law.
171. 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969).
172. Id. at 1268.
173. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 524-25 (3d Cir.
1969).
174. Id. at 524-25.
175. Id. at 532 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
176. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Defendant-Appellee
at 2, Allis-Chambers, 414 F.2d 506 (No. 17713).
177. See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 1009 (1970)
(mem.).
178. For example, none of the rulings in my data set from 1968 to 2000 mention precedents
such as Skidmore or its progeny. Moreover, only a relatively low percentage of rulings even
acknowledged the general issue of deference. In 2000, the Supreme Court clarified that agency
policy documents should be accorded Skidmore deference. See Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
179. The seminal case regarding deference was Chevron, USA., Inc. V.NaturalResources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.

820

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48-.771

Typically, the courts stated that the guidelines were relevant but not
controlling, a statement which in itself was true but not particularly
informative as to the guidelines' actual effect."o Notwithstanding the
considerable consistency characterizing explicit judicial statements
over time, Part II revealed that, in fact, deference accorded the
merger guidelines has generally increased since the late 1960s. This
is consistent with the broader trend in administrative law to accord
agencies greater deference.
The rulings and briefs indicated that courts deferred to the
guidelines to an extent more befitting agency rules than nonbinding
agency policy statements. Moreover, given that meaningful persuasion could not have occurred without discussion, this evidence was
generally inconsistent with the idea that the guideline influence
resulted from persuasion based on superior ideas. Overall, the
cases revealed a judiciary that all-too-frequently endorsed the
merger guidelines without substantively engaging them. These
vague administrative law rulings provided the guidelines room to
strengthen as an institution. As noted previously, by the 1990s some
courts had even taken to harmonizing inconsistent existing legal
precedent with new guidelines by moving the former towards the
latter.'
Even if courts had sought to more specifically prescribe the level
of deference owed to the guidelines, such an exercise would likely
have been undermined in the application. The primary contribution
of the Supreme Court's rulings was the establishment of a lower
bound; that lower bound did little to help illuminate precisely what
level of deference was warranted and under what circumstances. As
the Supreme Court has noted, deference is not "a device that
emasculates the significance of judicial review. ' Yet, the tremendous latitude courts enjoy regarding deference makes abdication a
real possibility-and a danger." Within this context, deference
180. See, e.g., FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986); California v.
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001); United States v. Hammermill
Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1280-81 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
181. See supra Part IIA.3.a (discussing 1992 Merger Guidelines and entry standards).
182. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd.of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984).
183. Increasingly, the dominant players in antitrust policy are the federal antitrust
agencies, even though their primary role in the system is that of law enforcement. Not only
are a decreasing percentage of cases litigated, but also, in absolute terms, the number
litigated is very small. This reflects a decreasing number of private suits, see Brodley, supra
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provides a conduit for guideline influence. Not only did deference
contribute to institutionalization, but institutionalization contributed to increased (and potentially unwarranted) deference.
Clearly, greater deference as a matter of administrative law can
lead to greater guideline influence independent of any institutionalization effect. However, when, as here, the amount of deference
the law confers is so clearly discretionary, and the courts themselves
almost never address deference issues, deference does little to
establish a band of appropriate agency influence. Influence, then, is
best understood in terms of additional forces, such as institutionalization.
4. Stealth Guidance:Influence Through Framing
Everyone operates according to some theory, or frame of reference, or paradigm-some generalized map that directs logic and
conclusions, given certain facts. The influence of one's paradigm
over one's decisions is enormous. It helps define what is important among the multitudes of events (i.e., it "sets one's attention"). And it literally programs one toward certain kinds of
conclusions."'
A critical but subtle channel for guideline influence is framing the
legal debate. This subsection explores the framing mechanism by
considering the effect of the guidelines' underlying principles,
analytical approaches, ordering of analysis, and implications for case
selection. This subsection also notes how the guidelines became a
universal reference point that, in turn, constrained the number and
types of nonguideline arguments arising in court.
Generally, framing becomes more powerful as the agent that
delivers the frame-the merger guidelines-becomes more accepted.
Framing, therefore, reinforces the influence of a particular set of
institutionalized guidelines, and the influence of guidelines as an
note 154, at 1 & n. 1 (describing the "drastic curtailment of private merger enforcement" since
1986), coupled with the frequency with which the antitrust agencies enter into consent
decrees, Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10 FALL
ANTITRUST 4 (2005) (describing consents as "more the rule than the exception" and noting that
"roughly 70 percent" of all DOJ complaints end in a consent). These trends increase the
importance of the judiciary's oversight role in the governmental system.
184. LOWI, supra note 2, at 293.
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institution. The effects of these aspects of framing are difficult to
gauge but can be vital. Little evidence exists in the rulings or briefs
that I have examined that indicates the courts were aware of or
adjusted their rulings to reflect the potentially powerful framing
effects of an institutionalized agency guideline. Thus, the actual
judicial deference is likely to have been greater than the deference
intended.
a. Selection of Guiding Principles
The most important mechanism through which the merger
guidelines established the overall terms of the legal debate was
through their advancement of an economic framework for assessing
mergers. Individuals and organizations that adopted various
guideline elements also assumed the underlying values and premises
-the economics-that support the document. Clearly, any court that
consciously sought to advance an economics-based approach would
have found useful 'Justification" in the guidelines. Though the
absence of the guidelines likely would not have deterred such courts
from their economic agenda, the presence of the guidelines might
well have influenced the manner and speed with which it was argued
and adopted.
The guidelines' economic basis manifested itself in many ways.
One of the most overt was the omission and subsequent repudiation
of the relevance of social and political factors when evaluating
merger legality. The 1968 Guidelines did not include consideration
of social and political factors from the legal calculus and focused
solely upon efficiency considerations. The 1982 Guidelines reinforced
this approach by explicitly rejecting any role for political and social
factors when assessing mergers.18 5 Though the relevance of these
noneconomic factors was arguably in decline, several prominent
jurists were unwilling to reject them categorically. Judge Patricia
Wald wrote, "I do not believe that the debate over the purposes of
antitrust laws has been settled yet.... I think it premature to
construct an antitrust test that ignores all other potential concerns

185. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § V(B) n.54 ("As a general matter, the
Department views the incorporation of non-competitive concerns into antitrust analysis as
inconsistent with the mandate contained in the antitrust laws.").
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of the antitrust laws except for restriction of output and price
raising."' 6 The guidelines arguably contributed to the further
subordination of the social and political objectives of antitrust by
both failing to recognize these factors and creating a framework that
did not easily permit their recognition.
In addition to excluding non-economic-based rationales for
antitrust, the guidelines' delineation of the goals of antitrust in
economic terms was furthered by their affirmative deployment of
economically-based legal tests. Sometimes, the increased role for
economics manifested itself through the elaboration of existing
guideline concepts rather than the introduction of new ones. For
example, the 1992 Guidelines replaced the 1982 Guidelines'
relatively brief discussion of entry with several new criteria that
were based primarily on economic theory. Under the 1992 Guidelines, "entry must be likely (i.e., profitable) at premerger prices
rather than the higher post-merger prices postulated under the old
Guidelines."18 7 The rationale was that "entry w[ould] not discipline
the exercise of market power unless it c[ould] return prices to
premerger levels." '8 Although this criterion may be more economically defensible, the problem became "how to prove that new entry
would occur at premerger prices, when it ha[d] not already occurred
at those prices."1'89 In addition to altering the standard against which
profitability was measured, "[t]he 1992 Guidelines ... introduced new
[economic] concepts that few lawyers ha[d] previously wrestled with,
called 'minimum viable scale' (MVS) and 'minimum efficient scale'
(MES)." 19°

186. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230-31 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Wald, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). This case addressed an action under section
1 of the Sherman Act involving the prohibition on "[e]very contract, combination, ... or
conspiracy in restraint of trade," in which the court relied heavily upon the 1982 Guidelines
for purposes of assessing market concentration. Id. at 220-21.
187. Janet L. McDavid, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Practitioner'sVew of
Key Issues in Defending a Merger, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 459, 465 (1993).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 465-66 ("MVS and MES are applied to determine whether entry would be
profitable if the entrant could capture the reduced output caused by the post-merger exercise
of market power.").
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b. Selection of Analytical Approach
The guidelines' underlying principles or values were also reflected
in concrete analytical approaches. These analytical approaches
further framed the terms of the debate. The guidelines, for example,
introduced key concepts often reflected in new terms, which
sometimes contained buried assumptions; recall how the HHI
concentration measure implicitly increased the importance of
dominant firms relative to the CR4 measure it displaced. 9 '
The impact of framing depended on the extent to which the "new"
analytical approaches were compatible with existing approaches. As
an example, consider market definition, which is a critical but often
ambiguous aspect of merger analysis. The 1982 Guidelines endorsed
a strongly economics-based approach to market definition. This
approach was as precise as it was abstract, and difficult to apply.
Although all courts did not immediately embrace the guidelines'
SSNIP test-primarily because of implementation difficulties-its
prominence alone changed the relative attractiveness of alternative
product market definition approaches by raising the bar regarding
economic expectations. The case evidence is consistent with the view
that the SSNIP test contributed to the decline of the less economically defensible submarket concept put forth in Brown Shoe Co.'9 2
As a practical matter, SSNIP was viewed as increasing the size of
antitrust markets, and with it, the difficulty of bringing cases.
Resistance to the measure was reflected in the National Association
of Attorneys General's Horizontal Merger Guidelines (NAAG
Guidelines), which incorporated other factors, including the ElzingaHogerty test, in its determination of geographic markets.' 9 ' Under
the NAAG Guidelines, "the geographic market will be defined as the
area encompassing the production locations from which [the
protected] group purchases seventy-five percent of their supplies of
the relevant product."'9 4 With regard to product markets, NAAG
191. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
192. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); see supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
193. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,406 (Mar. 30, 1993) [hereinafter NAAG
Guidelines].
194. Id. § 3.2.
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stated that reliance on the DOJ/FTC guideline method "will only be
considered where, in the opinion of the state Attorney General,
sufficient evidence is available to implement the methodology
19
workably and without speculation.""
c. Sequencing and Categorizationof Decisions
Because of its complexity, merger analysis is usually broken into
a sequence of simpler subdecisions. The psychology literature has
demonstrated that such sequential decision-making processes are
prone to biases because decision makers frequently do not revisit
early subdecisions despite later evidence suggesting that they
should." The merger guidelines' specification of a particular
sequence :of subdecisions has the potential to bias results.
One example of this problem was described earlier with respect to
the merger guidelines' categorization of "production substitution,"
which the 1984 Guidelines defined as a "shift by a firm in the use of
facilities from producing and selling one product to producing and
selling another ... within one year."'97 This substitution was considered to be market participation, which was factored into the
concentration calculation, whereas production substitution that took
longer was treated as a source of entry. If rigidly applied in this
fashion, however, production substitution would mitigate any
competitive effects of the proposed merger if treated as entry, but
might be insufficient to eliminate anticompetitive concerns when

195. Id. § 3.41.

In most situations, both the NAAG and DOJ/FTC market definition
methodologies will produce the same result. In the event that the two tests
produce different results, the Attorneys General will rely on the test that
appears most accurately to reflect the market and is based on the most reliable
evidence.
Id. Some difference in frames can be seen by comparing other laws or guidelines to the U.S.
merger guidelines. For example, early EU merger analysis emphasized dominant firms much
more than did the U.S. guidelines in place at the time. JAMES F. RILL ET AL., INT'L
COMPETITION NETwoRK, COORDINATED EFFECTS ANALYSIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL MERGER
REGIMES, in REPORT ON MERGER GUIDELINES, ch. 4, at 4 (2004), available at http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference-2ndmerida-2003/
amg-chap4_coordinated.pdf.
196. See supranotes 109-10 and accompanying text.
197. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.21 (emphasis added); see supra Part
II.A.3.b.
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treated as production substitution to lower HHIs. If the question of
where to allocate the production substitution in question were
revisited during the entry analysis stage, this problem would be
reduced. In fact, the 1992 Guidelines-arguably recognizing this
problem-made an explicit provision for this possibility.'98
Finally, I note that rigid adherence to a sequence of analysis,
which proceeds from market definition to the determination of
competitive effects and so on, carries a risk that "weaker" market
definitions are sometimes not sufficiently acknowledged in later
steps that depend on that market definition. Because this problem
existed in merger analysis prior to the guidelines, the guidelines'
explicit sequencing of analysis potentially reinforced it.'99
d. Selection of Cases and Arguments
Merger guidelines, as statements of enforcement policy, indicate
how federal agencies will conduct their merger analyses. As a result,
the agencies can be expected to initiate cases that are generally
consistent with the guidelines. One of the few guideline features
that have remained constant over time is the rather prominent
disclaimer that the guidelines do not bind the agencies themselves.
But if the agencies are unwilling to bring cases inconsistent with the
guidelines-effectively treating the guidelines as binding upon
themselves-then the significance of the guidelines as a screen in
determining which cases are pursued increases. Although in theory
the government can initiate cases that contravene its own guidelines, it rarely does so in practice and rarely, if ever, acknowledges
doing so.
Parties other than the federal government, such as states and
private parties, can also challenge mergers. As the guidelines
become increasingly institutionalized, these other parties become
198. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1.32. But see 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 43, § 2.21 (stating that production substitution that was easier may have also had less
long-term impact on reducing the anticompetitive effects of a merger). Although valid, the
one-year cut-off clearly is arbitrary with respect to impact.
199. See Malcolm B. Coate & A. E. Rodriguez, Pitfallsin MergerAnalysis: The Dirty Dozen,
30 N.M. L. REv. 227, 247 (2000) (arguing that "naive" sequential merger analysis does not
allow for consideration of all the analysis in its entirety, thereby leading to incorrect
decisions). The authors appear to argue that some courts engage in this "naive" sequential
analysis, whereas others correctly consider all the factors simultaneously. Id. at 248.
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more likely to use guideline analysis in their own decision making.
Namely, cases that do not lend themselves to analysis under the
guidelines may be deemed weaker by potential nonfederal agency
plaintiffs, who may then be less likely to bring them. Similarly,
positions deemed weaker under the guidelines may result in an
increased willingness to settle.2 °
The effect of using guidelines as a screening mechanism is that
fewer cases that are inconsistent with the guidelines will be
litigated. But these "weaker" cases may have been precisely among
the best candidates for exploring alternatives to guideline analysis.
The removal of such cases from the pool of litigated court cases may
have indirectly affected the evolution of the law.
Moreover, if the order in which fact patterns are ruled on matters,
then the diminution of fact patterns that come before the courts has
consequences for the evolution of the law. Significant reasons exist
to believe this does matter. For example, the 1968 Guidelines merely
omitted political and social considerations from the agency's merger
assessment policy; the 1982 Guidelines rejected those factors
outright. 0 1 One could readily imagine how a decreased willingness
to bring cases implicating those factors contributed to a selfreinforcing cycle whereby the factors became increasingly disused;
this in turn, led to less development of theories supporting them,
which then reduced the attractiveness of arguing such factors in
court.
e. PrimaryReference Point
The guidelines' indirect influence via the selection of cases and
arguments was magnified when the vast majority of litigants
employed them as a primary reference point. The merger guidelines
quickly became such a reference point because, even in their early
days, they were used as a tool for agency enforcement decisions
200. William Blumenthal, Ambiguity and Discretion in the New Guidelines: Some
Implications for Practitioners,61 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 485 (1993) (noting that differences
between the antitrust guidelines and the case law "may affect the private parties' decision on
whether to litigate and the tactics they employ").
201. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § V(B) n.54 ("As a general matter, the
Department views the incorporation of non-competitive concerns into antitrust analysis as
inconsistent with the mandate contained in the antitrust laws.").
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regarding mergers. For this reason, all agency antitrust lawyers,
both in government and in private practice, needed to understand
the guidelines and their rationale: knowledge of the guidelines was
de rigueurfor those practicing merger law.
This particular reference point was important because it structured the thinking of parties litigating merger cases and, as a
consequence, perhaps even the thinking of the courts. Though
several judges were particularly well-versed in the guidelines from
their own experiences as practitioners, the significance of the
guidelines as a common point of reference increased as the number
of alternative, shared references decreased. This decrease in clear
authoritative sources resulted from various litigation trends,
including the Supreme Court's failure to issue a merger ruling that
"commented upon the anti-merger provision's substantive liability
standard" after the mid-1970s 2
C. Types of Guideline Influence
I have argued that the guidelines, through their institutionalization, developed an enhanced ability to influence the law.
Here, I assess the broad trends in their influence. I begin by
grouping the possible departures from the law into three categories based on whether a guideline effectively refined, revised, or
rejected prevailing case law. Then I classify various components of
the successive guideline generations using these categories.
Institutionalization theory suggests that later guidelines were better
suited to support aggressive departures from case law than were
earlier ones, because the institution itself was stronger. The evidence
from my assessment of the cases supports this hypothesis.
1. Refine
Refinements include clarifications and other small deviations from
the legal status quo. "Refinement" guidelines could clarify a complex
legal analysis or interpolate between rulings. Such guidelines could
also refine the law by making the relevant factual determinations
that are generally required under the law. This effect would be a
202. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 148, at 439.
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form of operationalizing the law. Such guidelines would, in effect,
demonstrate factual applications of the common law. In that way,
they constitute an open advisory opinion of sorts.
Even when a guideline system only modestly refines the law, it
cannot be categorized as merely "restating" the law. Because the
deviation is small, the impact on antitrust discourse will be somewhat constrained in the first instance. However, not only can the
guidelines "pull" the law towards themselves, but they can also
resist reform otherwise underway. To the extent that the guidelines
persist while the common law shifts, the guidelines that "restate"the
law could possibly have a dragging effect on common law evolution.
2. Revise
A revision involves changes that are more substantial than
"refinements," but in which the guidelines remain somewhat consistent with some existing case law. This category includes guidelines that focus disproportionately on one of many alternative
approaches or principles existing under the common law, or
accelerate trends already apparent under the common law. Whether
a guideline revises, rather than refines, the prevailing common law
is ultimately a question of degree.
3. Reject
Guidelines may also diverge substantially from the common law.
Rejecting the law involves pursuing merger actions or proposing
analytical approaches that seem unwarranted under existing law, or,
vice versa, systematically ignoring actions-for nonresource reasons
-for which prosecution clearly seems warranted.
4. Trends in Influence
The iterations of successive merger guidelines defy easy categorization under this system. Each guideline generation arguably
contained more than one or perhaps even all three of these components. Despite this fact, on the most general level it is fair to say
that each guideline generation contained increasingly aggressive
departures from the prevailing common law. The 1968 Guidelines
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were predominantly a refinement because their provisions were

broadly consistent with existing legal principles of the time. The
specific thresholds in the 1968 Guidelines represented a somewhat
more aggressive change, however, than would normally qualify as a
refinement.
Many elements of the 1982 Guidelines were revisions. For
example, the guidelines explicitly incorporated and expanded on
the trend to weigh many nonconcentration factors by delineating
specifics, including the nature of purchases and differences in
products. 3 Introduction of the HHI concentration measure, although broadly consistent with existing law, clearly differed from the
CR4 concentration measure previously used. SSNIP constituted a
new market definition approach, but again not one inconsistent with
existing law focused on elasticity of substitution. Finally, the 1992
Guidelines' treatment of entry arguably constituted an example of
rejection. The guidelines specified that, to be considered "easy," entry
must be "timely, likely, and sufficient"20 4 if it is to affect merger
legitimacy, even though that same standard had been substantially
rejected by the D.C. Circuit.20 5
Over time, the merger guidelines have diverged increasingly from
judge-made law, and they have been increasingly successful at
prompting changes in that law. In so doing, the agencies' increased
willingness to codify their independent legal interpretations in the
form of guidelines also acts as a barometer for gauging the increasing role agencies played or perceived themselves to play in articulating merger law.
D. The Congruence Hypothesis Is Not Supported
An alternative explanation to the institutionalization theory is
that changes in the guidelines' apparent influence merely reflected
changes in the guidelines' congruence with the state of the law.
Under this theory, one would cite the guidelines as a short hand for
the relevant precedent. Frequent guideline citation would indicate
only that they effectively restated current law, and not that the
203. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supranote 1, § III(C)(1)(a).
204. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.0.
205. See supra Part II.A.3.a (discussing United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1990)).
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guidelines influenced the content of the law. The institutionalization
theory does not require a rejection of the notion that some of the
apparent guideline influence arises from its congruence with the law,
because feedback from congruence is explicitly incorporated in the
theory. The theory does maintain, however, that the guidelines
developed a strong, independent influence that shaped the law.
Graph 2 shows that the rate of reference to the merger guidelines
increased slightly between 1977 and 1982, and increased much more
steeply thereafter. 6 Table 2 indicates a similar pattern with respect
to the rulings' reliance on the merger guidelines, though the increase
is stronger throughout the period. 20 7 These patterns support the
institutionalization hypothesis.
Can a strict congruence hypothesis also explain this pattern?
Under the congruence hypothesis, reliance increases as the substance of the law and of the guidelines converges.2 " Because the
leniency standard of any particular guideline is constant, the
relative leniency of the law and the guidelines in the 1982 switchover can be used to distinguish the two hypotheses. This analysis
depends on the leniency of each guideline relative to the common
law. Overall, it is generally thought that both the 1968 and the 1982
Guidelines were more lenient than the law at the time each guideline was introduced and that the 1982 Guidelines were relatively
more lenient than the 1968 Guidelines. 20 9 This merger enforcement
trend toward greater leniency would persist throughout the 1980s.2 1 °
Whether the 1968 Guidelines were more or less lenient than the law
in 1982 is less clear. I consider both possibilities.
Assume, arguendo,that the common law was less lenient than the
1968 Guidelines in 1982, and that the law became more lenient.
206. See supra Graph 2.
207. See supra Table 2.
208. A more sophisticated variant of this hypothesis would allow positive versus negative
differences to have asymmetric reliance effects.
209. When the 1968 Guidelines were supplanted, the FTC wrote, "the two agencies have
both concluded that continued reliance on the [1968 Guidelines] is no longer appropriate."
1982 Statement, supra note 41, § II. Most observers seem to believe that the change was
significant: "[I]t
seems reasonably clear that the 1982 Guidelines are much more permissive
toward horizontal mergers than the 1968 Guidelines or court decisions." Cohen & Sullivan,
supranote 68, at 456; see also Fox, supranote 77, at 522, 550-51, 553-55 (comparing the 1968
and 1982 Guidelines).
210. William E. Kovacic, FailedExpectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Futureof
the ShermanAct as a Tool for Deconcentration,74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1140-41 (1989).
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Further assume that the law became increasingly lenient through
1985, but was less lenient than the 1968 Guidelines in 1982.211 The
congruence hypothesis would predict a general increase in the rate
of reference and degree of reliance on the merger guidelines through
1982 and, in fact, such increases occurred. As the 1982 Guidelines
were more lenient than the 1968 Guidelines, however, the congruence hypothesis would also predict a decrease in the reference rate
and degree of reliance after 1982, which is contrary to the
evidence.2 12

211. See infra Graph 4a.
212. See infra Graph 4b.
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Now assume the reverse scenario, in which the law became
more lenient than the 1968 Guidelines by 1982. In that case, the
congruence hypothesis would predict a hump pattern with the
greatest rate of reference and degree of reliance occurring in the year
when the guidelines and the law were most consistent in terms of
leniency. In 1983 there would be an increase or decrease in reliance
depending on whether the 1982 Guidelines were relatively closer or
farther from the law than the 1968 Guidelines. This predicted
pattern is not supported, as there is no big peak and falloff in the
years prior to 1982. Thus, the rate and reliance data do not appear
to support a strict congruence hypothesis.
It is also worth noting that the institutionalization theory without
the congruence element also does not predict the observed pattern
very well. Although the general increase in reliance fits the pure
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institutionalization story, the sharp increase in reliance after the
introduction of the 1982 Guidelines does not. Institutionalization
with congruence, however, would allow that increase to be explained.
Finally, I note that if the law was the primary source of influence,
judges would have been able to cite to precedent rather than to the
less authoritative merger guidelines. Additionally, if the guidelines
were being used merely as restatements of the law, courts that
disagreed with guideline policies likely would not find reconciliation
with them necessary. Collectively, the statistics and case studies are
evidence that the merger guidelines exist as an institution with
influence apart from their congruence with the law. Thus, a "strict"
congruence hypothesis, which does not admit of any shaping of the
law via the guidelines, is not supported.
IV. GUIDELINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION: ASSESSMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Part II illustrated increased guideline influence and Part III
interpreted that historical development through the prism of
institutionalization. Part IV provides a normative assessment of this
institutionalization-based influence and offers recommendations to
identify and curb the excesses.
A. Normatively Assessing Guideline Influence
The judiciary's insufficiently critical reliance on the guidelines
illuminates why they have not only failed to check that influence but
also how they have become a primary vehicle for that influence. This
Section argues that deference to the guidelines is excessive as both
a legal and public policy matter. The widespread rise and judicial
acceptance of the administrative state reflected the recognition that
the legislature cannot address all contingencies in the law as enacted
and, therefore, various quasi-legislative activities such as rulemaking should be delegated to expert administrative agencies.2 13 The
213. Rulemaking typically begins with the passage of a law that also delegates to an agency
the authority to pass detailed rules that implement the basic law. The authorized agency then
engages in a rulemaking process under the APA that requires the rulemaking process to meet
a number of procedural requirements including public notice and comment. The resulting
rules are then generally treated as binding on the courts. When administrative agencies lack
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proper role and influence of agency guidelines is nested in larger
questions regarding the benefits and costs associated with congressional delegation and judicial deference to agency expertise. Rather
than engaging in these broader debates, I adopt the current division
of powers as a starting point and explore how guideline institutionalization affects that balance of power in theory and in
practice.
Over time, agencies have increasingly employed policy development that lacks many of the process protections of formal rulemaking. If delegation of rulemaking powers-even under informal
rulemaking-to an expert agency is seen as acceptable, why should
there be any additional concerns when a set of institutionalized
(expert) agency guidelines has rule-like influence with the courts?
The guidelines' rule-like influence over the courts poses two major
concerns. The first concern is broad: what should be the guidelines'
role given the separation of powers in the overall governmental
system? The second concern is narrower and derives from the dual
and frequently conflicting purposes enforcement guidelines serve.
1. Separationof Powers
As a threshold matter, the merits of the movement of regulatory
agencies towards informal rulemaking are debatable from the
viewpoint of the governmental process. Further, Congress has not
granted the agencies rulemaking power within either the antitrust
realm generally or the merger realm specifically. For guidelines to
gain a status akin to rules, therefore, is inappropriate as a matter of
law.2 14 Indeed, for those wary of giving agencies a quasi-legislative
role through rulemaking in the first place, enabling agencies to
rulemaking authority, they still have multiple options, involving varying levels of formality,
with regard to policy articulation.
214. Articulations of policy such as the merger guidelines-unless developed under formal
rulemaking authority-should not be treated as similar to rules, because such treatment
would be tantamount to allowing executive or independent regulatory agencies a legislative
role. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them To Bind the Public?,41 DUKE L.J.
1311 (1992). Anthony's answer to the question he posed in the title was an emphatic "no." Id.
at 1312. He then argued that "[t]o use such nonlegislative documents to bind the public
violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and dishonors our system of limited
government." Id.
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indirectly acquire that power via guidelines is a step in the wrong
direction.2 1 5 One scholar aptly characterized the 1982 Guidelines in
the following way: "[U]nder the guise of regularizing discretion, the
antitrust laws are being amended without benefit of congressional
action."21 Former Assistant Attorney General Sanford Litvak,
appearing in 1985 before the House Judiciary's Subcommittee on
Monopolies and Commercial Law, echoed this sentiment. Litvak
stated that, despite having been "personally" involved in several
antitrust guideline efforts, he was "troubled by what [he had] called
the trend toward enforcement by guideline.... Clearly, guidelines can
be helpful to businessmen in understanding how the Department
approaches its enforcement responsibilities.... But those guidelines
were not and were never intended to be a replacement for enforcement and development by case law."2 7
2. Dual Mandates
Guidelines and rules are not variants of the same species of
regulatory policy. Unlike rules, the merger guidelines articulate how
the agencies will exercise their prosecutorial discretion. Like rules,
they also interpret the law, though the merger guidelines do so
implicitly and with arguably a greater push towards advocating
what the law should be. Under certain circumstances these dual
mandates may become dueling mandates.
Enforcement policies necessarily reflect numerous factors such as
resource constraints. Resource constraints may promote analytical
short cuts and rule selection to eliminate potentially meritorious
cases that consume excessive resources relative to other actions.
Such policies, if adopted as law, are forces in a conservative legal
215. The procedural history of the promulgation of merger guidelines gives little comfort
on this separation of powers issue: the record has been one of vastly differing promulgation
processes representing different levels of "voluntary"consistency with the APA. In particular,
the level of public participation, the linchpin of APA requirements, has varied substantially
over time. In essence, the level of public participation has been subject to the discretion of the
agencies themselves. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text; see also Greene, supra
note 41, at 1045-47 (describing "the FTC's role as an expert body").
216. Schwartz, supranote 109, at 576.
217. Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 135 (1985) (statement of Sanford Litvack, Former
Assistant Att'y Gen. for the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice).
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direction: fewer cases would be found to violate the law. The
situation is not quite that simple, though, as prosecutorial enforcement policies may also reflect preferences across different types of
cases and, therefore, may be more aggressive on a particular
dimension. For example, during the early 1990s the FTC began
pursuing a line of section 5 cases on a controversial and aggressive
"invitations to collude" theory. ' Nevertheless, though an enforcement policy will not always operate in a conservative direction on
every dimension, resource constraints necessarily force the policy to
be conservative on some dimensions.
The guidelines, then, are likely to reflect compromises forced by
inherent tensions between prosecutorial and legal standard goals.
Guidelines and rules are not that closely related. Because guidelines
are motivated by multiple goals much more so than conventional
rules, they pose more danger to the governmental process even if, for
example, they were promulgated with procedures similar to those
comprising informal rulemaking. Deference under such circumstances should be tempered. At a minimum, the courts should be
aware that certain elements of the guidelines would have been
different if they were written solely for prosecutorial purposes or
solely to influence the law. Elements such as the 1800 HHI threshold
for concern, or perhaps a statement of a safety zone, could easily
reflect prosecutorial requirements in place of a preferred standard
for antitrust law, even though the method of analysis, such as using
HHIs, would not necessarily be adopted for prosecutorial reasons.
B. GuidanceRegarding Guidelines
Given the unacknowledged phenomenon of guideline institutionalization and the consequent excessive guideline influence, I
offer several recommendations for moderating the treatment of
guidelines in a manner that preserves their legitimate role as both
a prosecutorial enforcement tool and a source for ideas about
antitrust jurisprudence. Substantial promise lies in reforming the
manner in which the guidelines are used on a case-by-case basis.
This reform can be accomplished by heightening awareness among
218. See, e.g., YKK (USA), Inc., 116 F.T.C. 628 (1993); Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., 115
F.T.C. 944 (1992).
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all participants in the legal process regarding the actual status of
enforcement guidelines, notwithstanding the guidelines' institutionalization. Just as the level of today's institutionalization arose
from the independent decisions of individual actors, so too will the
reduction of that influence come from the cumulative effect of
individual decision makers.
The proposed reforms are not predicated on the conclusion that
the path along which merger law evolved during this period of
institutionalization was substantively wrong. In fact, many commentators, if not most, believe that the merger guidelines have positively
influenced the substantive evolution of merger law. I believe,
however, that the process was flawed and that the substantive
antitrust developments were not predestined and perhaps could have
been better. Thus, the thrust of these reforms is to the future and
not toward "unscrambling" the effects of merger guideline
institutionalization in the past.
1. Guideline Usage in the Courts
Antitrust guidelines, in another context, have been characterized
'
"as a portable amicus brief."2 19
This statement accurately identified
the courts as an intended-and arguably the prime-audience of the
guidelines. As discussed, multiple factors suggest the wisdom of a
more circumspect judicial approach regarding the merger guidelines.
Certainly, judges can readily adopt such a stance without legislation
or changed legal standards. Any movement of the courts along these
lines would immediately have salutary ripple effects in terms of how
parties argue to the court and-perhaps-how the agencies promulgate the guidelines.
For example, judges could advise parties before them that they
would be well-served by supporting any important legal propositions
with authorities other than, or in addition to, the merger guidelines.
To the extent that litigants still relied heavily on the guidelines, the
persuasiveness of the guideline content would be explored. If the
court itself references the guidelines in either hearings or rulings,
the court should clearly articulate the basis for and extent of its
reliance on the guidelines. Ideally, judicial transparency with regard
219. H.R. REP. No. 99-113, at 32 (1985).
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to the guidelines would also encompass explicitly acknowledging
divergence from the guidelines rather than obscuring divergence by
choosing a nonguideline outcome without acknowledging inconsistency with the guidelines.
The danger persists that courts may be less than forthcoming in
their rulings-perhaps, for example, by failing to candidly acknowledge heavy reliance on the merger guidelines when that reliance
results from burdens associated with workloads. However, if courts
more directly address deference issues, this possibility should be
ameliorated. Substantively engaging the guidelines would render
more difficult the "smuggling [of agency] views on prosecution policy
into crystallized law."2 ' It would not, however, interfere with the
healthy process of engaging new ideas embodied in the guidelines.
Additionally, this recommendation is consistent with not only the
long-standing precedent regarding deference owed nonbinding
guidelines, but also the Supreme Court's recent and unambiguous
ruling in Christensen v. HarrisCounty that the courts owe Skidmore
deference, not Chevron deference, to agency policy documents.2 2 '
Under Christensen,judicial deference is not automatically conferred
but must be earned through persuasion.2 22 Though this decision did
not resolve many of the ambiguities rooted in Skidmore, it provided
a necessary reminder regarding the very limited deference owed
guidelines. In fact, this one decision already appears to have had
limited salutary effects. 2 ' Society must seize the opportunity to
expand on those positive effects.
2. Guideline Promulgationby the Agencies
The merger guidelines, as written, are relatively free-standing.
That is, the guidelines do not reference the relevant legal precedent
or other nonstatutory sources that give shape, substance, and
direction to the prevailing legal framework. By deliberately eschewing any external point of reference, the guidelines are less con220. Schwartz, supra note 109, at 576-77.
221. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000).
222. See id. at 587.
223. Though it is difficult to discern Christensen'sprecise influence, United States v.Oracle
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1113-23 (N.D. Cal. 2004), indicates some judicial resistance to
the merger guidelines' approach with regard to the specific issue of unilateral effects.
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strained by current law. As a prosecutorial enforcement policy
document, less reliance on the common law is understandable, as the
two can be expected to differ. As a document with the purpose of
changing the law, however, one can cynically interpret the absence
of case law support as an implicit recognition that the guideline view
of what the law should be, and the law itself, are not the same.
I recommend, therefore, that agencies produce a background
document along with their guidelines that provides explicit common
law and scholarly support and analysis for the guideline elements.2 24
Many of the examples of deference given above suggest that
nonspecialist judges rely on the guidelines in part because they offer
a solution to understanding the merger analysis problem that is less
easily or clearly distilled from analysis of relevant case law. If the
merger guidelines explicitly grounded their precepts on relevant
authority, judges would have easier access to that authority. This
increased transparency of guideline analysis would aid critical legal
discourse.
The FTC and the DOJ recently released the Commentary on the
2 2 As the Commentary
HorizontalMerger Guidelines (Commentary).
forward announces, its purpose is to increase "the transparency of
the analytical process by which the Agencies apply the antitrust
laws to horizontal mergers."22 6 Another arguable purpose of the
Commentary, like the guidelines themselves, is to influence the
courts. As Paul T. Denis has observed, the Commentary not only
explains agency thinking but also constitutes an "attempt to reclaim
ground lost in litigation and to put down markers on points they
hope to establish in the future."2 2 7 Unfortunately, as Denis further
notes, those Commentary portions seeking to reclaim or establish
particular legal points "are in narrative passages that do not relate
224. Some limited, recent precedent exists for such an approach. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 n.10 (1995), available at http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publi/
guidelines/0558.htm.
225. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIzoNTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/Commentaryonthe
HorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf.
226. Id. at v.
227. Paul T. Denis, The Give and Take of the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 20 ANTITRUST 51, 51 (2006). Denis was a principal draftsman of the 1992 Merger
Guidelines.
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to specific case studies."2 ' By taking this approach, the Commentary
provides a user-friendly manual to the guidelines but does not
provide judges easier access to the relevant law. The Agencies should
recognize that situating their interpretations and enforcement
analysis within the underlying legal debates will not diminish their
ability to provide meaningful practical guidance and will enhance
their ability to promote meaningful legal discourse.
3. Guidelines,Rules, and Rulemaking-like Procedures
The courts, and others, frequently accord rule-like deference to the
guidelines. Towards that end, it is worth considering whether the
agencies should instead merely promulgate merger rules, or
similarly adopt rulemaking-type procedures when promulgating
their guidelines. I argue the former is not an option and the latter is
not a clear improvement over the status quo.
Agency rulemaking within this context is not a viable option. The
DOJ enjoys no express or implicit grant of rulemaking authority
within the antitrust realm. Though in theory one could argue that
the FTC enjoys rulemaking authority in the competition context, it
is not clear that position would prevail, and as a practical matter it
is equally unlikely the FTC would advance such a position. As the
ABA's Special Committee To Study the Role of the FTC has written,
"we are not optimistic about the chances that the FTC could codify
antitrust-oriented prohibitions [that is, rules] on specific types of
business conduct."2'29 Moreover, as the two agencies are jointly
responsible for enforcement of the Clayton Act, given their institutional history the FTC would not likely issue binding rules that the
DOJ would not be bound to follow.
Increased transparency could also be encouraged by changing
other aspects of guideline promulgation.2 30 For example, given the
228. Id.
229. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW SPECIAL
COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, reprinted in 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 91 n.103 (1989).
230. Note the distinction between imposing rulemaking procedures on guideline
promulgation and authorizing actual rulemaking authority. The latter would allow the
agencies to make rules whereas the former only increases transparency with respect to
nonbinding guidelines. If the episode concerning the FTC's use of its unfairness authority is
any indication, Congress appears deeply resistant to the idea of giving formal rulemaking

842

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:771

extraordinary, almost rule-like, deference given guidelines, the
agencies could consider providing a greater role for public input. In
the past, the agencies sometimes have shown some willingness to
engage in APA-like procedures such as notice and comment when
promulgating their guidelines, although this openness to public
comment has been uneven at best. For example, the antitrust
agencies solicited public comments regarding the Draft Intellectual
Property Guidelines,23 1 but not the Health Care Guidelines.2 32
Based on this experience, we cannot rely on the agencies to
voluntarily engage in such transparency-enhancing actions on a
consistent basis. Congress could, in theory, impose some procedural
requirements like public notice and comment on agency guidelinemaking, but the legislative history regarding such a requirement is
not encouraging. Reflecting a degree of congressional dissatisfaction
with the DOJ's antitrust guidelines regarding vertical restraints, a
bill arose in 1985 in the House of Representatives that, if passed,
would have increased procedural requirements for antitrust guideline promulgation.23 3 Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), the
key sponsor of the 1985 bill, reintroduced the bill in 1993.234 Both the
FTC and DOJ vigorously opposed this legislation,"' which ultimately
failed. Although these experiences do not rule out the possibility that
Congress could pass such legislation, they do suggest that successful
reform along these lines is likely to be difficult. After all, the
antitrust agencies likely would not pioneer a movement to rethink
the role of guidelines when such an enterprise could ultimately
result in a diminution of guideline power-and consequently agency
power.
Even if politically feasible, whether the benefit of imposing
additional procedural requirements would offset the cost of such
authority to regulatory agencies under a mandate as broad as the Clayton Act. See Michael
M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on State Law, 46
WAYNE L. REv. 1869, 1873 (2000).
231. Draft Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property,
59 Fed. Reg. 41,339 (Aug. 11, 1994).
232. U.S. Dep't of Justice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, reprinted in 41 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153 (Aug. 18, 1996).
233. Antitrust Procedural Fairness Act of 1985, H.R. 1467, 99th Cong. (1985).
234. Antitrust Procedural Fairness Act of 1993, H.R. 489, 103d Cong. (1993).
235. See, e.g., Authorization for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ: Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, H. Comm. on the Judiciary,99th
Cong. 147 (1985).
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requirements is unclear. The most obvious drawbacks are the costs
and loss of flexibility resulting from extensive formal procedures.23 6
Costs involve not just the actual resources involved in promulgation
processes, but also potential litigation costs predicated on abuse of
the procedures and uncertainty about an agency's policy that such
litigation entails.23 7 Further, additional procedures may increase an
agency's reluctance to make timely revisions to existing guidelines,2 38
in the extreme possibly changing the guidelines from an agent of
change to a barrier to change.2 39 Additional procedural requirements
would also limit the speed and flexibility with which an agency could
alter its prosecutorial enforcement policy. Further, the same
separation-of-powers argument that calls into question a regulatory
agency's role in "legislation" would suggest that the agency should
have discretion in its prosecutorial enforcement policy sphere.
Ironically, one subtle effect of an increased procedural requirement,
such as notice and comment, is that it might lead courts to increase
their deference towards the guidelines. Unless one thinks the
formulation process would be greatly improved, increased
institutionalization may pose the greater threat from the viewpoint
of process.2 40
V. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND OTHER GUIDELINE SYSTEMS

Agency guidelines and guideline-like policy statements are
ubiquitous in the U.S. government. Some of the guidelines, such as
236. These costs will be lower with fewer formal rulemaking procedures.
237. Litigation challenging the guidelines, of course, also presents a benefit by effectively
constraining the discretion of the agencies in the writing of their guidelines.
238. One frequent impetus to change is that the industry facts on which guidelines are
written may have changed. This problem is most salient in the case of industry-specific
guidelines, such as the health care antitrust guidelines. The FTC industry guidelines, which
were based on many industry facts, arguably suffered from this problem. See Greene, supra
note 41, at 1041-43.
239. In the case of formal rulemaking without new antitrust statutes, the promulgating
agency's discretion may also be limited by existing precedent.
240. Because my purpose was to preserve the value of the antitrust guidelines, I did not
consider the alternative of eliminating the guidelines completely. Guidelines meet the
challenge posed by the need for predictability in agency enforcement and allay concerns about
inequity attendant to ad hoc merger challenges. Further, they expedite the development of
a coherent legal doctrine for merger analysis. Litigation alone is arguably too piecemeal to
provide predictability, and Congress is arguably unwilling to provide the needed level of
clarification, perhaps for good reason.
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Patent and Trademark Office procedures for examination of patent
applications and federal sentencing guidelines, were promulgated
primarily to ensure the consistency of administrative or judicial
determinations, whereas others were intended to interpret statutes,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines on various types of discrimination or the FTC unfairness
policy statement. Many guidelines combine legal judgments with
some findings of industry facts-for example, FTC antitrust industry
guides and the FTC environmental advertising guidelines. Still
others, like federal antitrust merger guidelines, have multiple goals,
including, for example, explaining prosecutorial enforcement policy
and advocating legal interpretations.
In this Part, I examine three additional guideline settings through
the prism of guideline institutionalization. Changing the guideline
context enables me to illustrate additional dimensions of guideline
influence. The first example discusses how the FERC and the FCC
drew upon the federal antitrust guidelines when exercising their
independent merger review authority. The merger guidelines,
therefore, influenced not only private litigants and the courts but
also other federal agencies. The second example considers the
influence of federal guidelines and their revisions on state law
through consideration of the FTC's unfairness policy statement. This
example reveals both how superseded policy statements will
sometimes maintain a separate institutional identity and how
federal guidelines can influence judicial interpretations of state law.
The third example involves the federal sentencing guidelines, which
recently became nonbinding through a Supreme Court ruling. This
example allows an examination of "deinstitutionalization" and
several factors that may determine the extent to which sentencing
guideline influence changes over time. More fundamentally, then,
these three distinctive examples collectively underscore the necessity
of understanding the nature and extent of guideline institutionalization when considering guideline influence.
A. Interagency Guideline Influence: FERC and the FCC
Mergers are reviewed by the antitrust agencies and several
additional federal agencies that exercise limited, concurrent
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jurisdiction for particular industries. As such, the realm of merger
guideline influence theoretically extends not only to the courts and
private litigants but also to other federal agencies. This Section
briefly considers the nature and extent of FERC and the FCC
reliance on antitrust agency merger guidelines. These two agencies
have limited authority for reviewing mergers in the energy and
communications industries, respectively. Authority is granted them
under section 7 of the Clayton Act ("substantial lessening of competition"), 241 but the agencies also have a broader mandate to consider
whether mergers are in the "public interest." Consistent with the
guideline institutionalization theory, the merger guidelines appear
to have influenced these nonantitrust agencies and the legal
developments within these related, but distinctive, forums.
FERC's activities from the mid-1990s to the present are particularly illuminating. Throughout the 1990s, FERC largely assessed
competitive effects of mergers through the merger guideline
format.24 2 The wisdom of FERC's reliance on the merger guidelines
can be debated, but it was clearly not required as a legal matter.
Though clear political and practical reasons exist why FERC might
look to the antitrust agencies' policies for "guidance," the wisdom of
FERC's wholesale adoption of the agencies' value judgments and
trade-offs, in terms of how it seeks to apply the law, is less clear-cut.
In the late 1990s, FERC solicited public input while formulating
its own merger guidelines. 243 FERC launched this undertaking in
response to criticism that its policies needed clarification and that
the general, non-industry-specific antitrust guidelines were not
readily applicable to the unique contours of the energy industry-particularly given the important and changing role of regulation. FERC ultimately adopted wholesale the antitrust merger
guidelines within its own energy merger guidelines.2 4 4 The antitrust
guideline analysis constitutes the first prong of FERC's analysis and,

241. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
242. 18 C.F.R. § 2.26 (2006); see also Robert J. Michaels, Market Power in Electric Utility
Mergers: Access, Energy, and the Guidelines, 17 ENERGY L.J. 401, 401 (1996) ('The FERC ...
often uses the concentration standards of the Guidelines in its decision process.").
243. Michaels, supra note 242, at 402.
244. Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC'sPolicy on Electric Mergers:A Bit of Perspective, 18
ENERGY L.J. 113, 116-17 (1997).
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therefore, plays a critical role in case screening.2 41 Such heavy
reliance on the antitrust agency framework makes it more likely
that FERC will reach the same merger review decision as the DOJ.
There is arguably some merit to the persistent arguments that
parties contemplating mergers should not be subjected to multiple
levels of federal analysis. The outcry is even greater if the merging
firm is also subjected to multiple competitive inquiries that are
conducted differently. Addressing those arguments is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, the ability of another agency, whether
FERC or another, to challenge or at least resist the antitrust
agencies' merger policy analysis will likely vary inversely with the
extent to which that policy has become institutionalized.
Whether intentionally or not, the FCC apparently has followed a
path that would render it somewhat more immune from the forces
of institutionalization surrounding the merger guidelines. The FCC
possesses jurisdiction to review mergers under both the Clayton Act
and the Communications Act of 1934.246 Despite its dual jurisdiction,
the FCC invariably relies on its Communications Act jurisdiction
and, at most, "pay[s] lip service" to its Clayton Act authority.2 4 7 The
FCC's reliance on the Communication Act's public interest standard
means "the FCC can extend its competitive analysis far beyond the
traditional approach used by the FTC and DOJ under the Clayton
Act."24 Moreover, the FCC has also resisted formulation of enforcement guidelines that would, invariably, lead to persistent comparisons to the antitrust merger guidelines. Though the FCC has often
been criticized for relying too heavily upon its own unique interpretation of its public interest standard,2 49 in so doing it has arguably
avoided certain tensions with the antitrust agencies that are
inherent in FERC's path.

245. See 18 C.F.R. § 2.26.
246. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-615b (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); see James R. Weiss & Martin L.
Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdictionof the FCC and the Justice Department
over Telecommunications Transactions,6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195, 197-98 (1998).
247. Id. at 198.
248. Harvey I. Saferstein, Antitrust Issues for Telecom Mergers and Acquisitions, 739
PLI/PAT 101, 110 (2003).
249. Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and Interagency Governance, 2003
MICH. ST. L. REv. 701, 703-04.
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Although the FCC's policy has probably allowed it greater
independence in competitive impact determinations, it does not
necessarily follow that the FCC's internal deliberations were not
heavily influenced by the merger guidelines. Moreover, the FCC's
practice of relying on the guidelines for propositions with which it
agrees, but diverging from the guidelines as it deems necessary
given the FCC's unique mandate and the nature of the industry it
oversees, has itself been the cause of difficulties for the FCC. 0
Notwithstanding such issues regarding the FCC's actual or alleged
independent thinking, it should be noted as a practical matter that
the FCC rarely challenges mergers that the antitrust agencies
themselves do not question, though it may obtain changes in the
proposed merger, as conditions for approval, that might not be
required by the antitrust agencies.
In sum, it is important to remember that the antitrust merger
guidelines are "merely" antitrust agency statements of enforcement
policy. Because the guidelines reflect policy preferences as well as
constraints such as resources, one could readily imagine that the
industry regulatory authorities might arrive at different conclusions
regarding competitive effects (and, of course, different conclusions
based on the public interest standard). However, the extent to which
other agencies that scrutinize mergers feel able to engage in such
independent merger policy formulation will depend in large part on
the extent to which the dominant guidelines have become institutionalized.2 5 '
B. Guideline Generationsand Split Institutions:FTC Unfairness
Statement
The FTC Act's 1938 amendments empowered the FTC to prohibit
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" as well as "[u]nfair methods of
' which were not allowed under
competition,"2 52
the FTC's enabling
250. The Third Circuit Court ofAppeals identified a tension inherent in the FCC using the
1992 Guidelines for certain propositions and then diverging from those guidelines regarding
other propositions. The court required the FCC to justify this discrepancy on remand.
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 433 (3d Cir. 2004).
251. Any individual case also has an agency-to-agency set of influences based on
recognition of each agency's respective expertise and sharing of information.
252. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938)
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legislation in 1914.25 This expanded jurisdiction enabled the FTC to
"protect[] consumers directly, as well as through its antitrust
efforts. 25 4 In 1964, the FTC promulgated an unfairness policy
statement that established the agency's guidelines for determining
whether a practice constituted an unfair act or practice for purposes
of the 1938 amendment. The history of the FTC's unfairness
guidelines provides a unique vantage point for understanding
guideline influence and institutionalization.
A fundamental difference between the unfairness guidelines and
the merger guidelines is that the FTC is the sole enforcer of the law
as it relates to the former at the federal level. Not surprisingly, the
FTC's unfairness guidelines command tremendous deference at the
federal level. However, many states have adopted "little FTC Acts,"
which oftentimes include unfairness provisions modeled, to varying
degrees, on the FTC's guidelines. In the time since the state
legislatures adopted unfairness provisions and state courts have
interpreted those provisions, the FTC has revised its own guidelines.
Even when superseded at the federal level, however, the FTC's
earlier unfairness guidelines persisted as an institution in its own
right at the state level. This Section briefly discusses this phenomenon.
In 1964 the FTC promulgated a trade regulation rule, the
"Cigarette Rule," 255 whose Statement of Basis and Purpose delineated its test for determining when an act or practice was "unfair."
The rule addressed whether the act (1) "offends public policy," (2) "is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous," and (3) "causes
substantial injury to consumers., 25 6 Though the Cigarette Rule itself
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000)).
253. Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm'n to Senators Ford and Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980),
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 98-156, at 35 n.5 (1983) [hereinafter FTC Letter].
254. J. Howard Beales, III, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC's
Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, http://www.ftc.gov/
speecheslbeales/unfairO603.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
255. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (July 2,
1964). The rule was never enforced, as Congress subsequently passed legislation regarding
cigarette package labeling. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No.
89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000)).
256. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. at 8355.
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was never implemented, its Statement of Basis and Purpose, which

contained the three-prong test, would persist.2 7 Nearly ten years
later, the Supreme Court mildly endorsed this rule in FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co.258
In the late 1970s, the FTC engaged in numerous rulemakings
under its unfairness authority-including one particularly controversial rulemaking involving advertising that targeted children-that
prompted a congressional backlash.259 In response to the backlash,
the Commission sent a letter to Congress in 1980 detailing its "Policy
Statement on Unfairness, 26 ° which set forth the Commission's view
on the scope of its unfairness authority.261 The Policy Statement did
not merely elaborate on the Cigarette Rule's Statement of Basis and
Purpose. Though it further delineated the consumer injury factor, it
narrowed the range of actions that would be deemed to "offend[]
public policy" and rejected outright the "immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous" factor as an independent basis for an
unfairness action.262 The revised policy statement's overall thrust
was an increased emphasis upon the consumer injury factor.
The Policy Statement's influence did not derive primarily from the
gradual institutionalization process described with regard to the
257. Congress requested that the FTC postpone implementation of its Cigarette Rule while
Congress conducted its own inquiries. Ultimately, Congress introduced legislation that
addressed the issue underlying the FTC's efforts (that is, cigarette industry advertising). That
legislation prohibited any other. Thus, the 1964 Cigarette Rule itself was never directly
enforced. See supra note 255.
258. 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
259. See Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection:
Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 924-26 (2005)
(discussing the FTC's "children's advertising" rule and ensuing congressional response).
260. FTC Letter, supra note 253, at 33-40.
261. Id. at 33-40. The Commission claimed that its Statement on Unfairness was a
synthesis from "a review of the decided cases and rules and ... a concrete indication of the
manner in which the Commission has enforced, and wil [sic] continue to enforce, its
unfairness mandate," id. at 34, but the circumstances underlying the letter strongly suggested
that the Commission's policy statement had political as well as legal goals. Note that the costbenefit tests included in the Policy Statement were anticipated in the 1975 FTC rulemaking
"Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses." 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,522-23 (Nov. 18,
1975); FTC Letter, supra note 253, at 37.
262. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. "To justify a finding of unfairness the
[consumer] injury must satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed
by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and
it must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided." FTC
Letter, supra note 253, at 36.
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merger guidelines, because the FTC controlled the primary channel
to institutionalize the new definition: the channel of administrative
adjudication. The Commission could enshrine its own unfairness
definition in its own adjudicatory rulings, which, if reasonable,
would receive deference and endorsement by higher courts. And, in
fact, the 1980 Unfairness Statement quickly became the touchstone
for determining the scope of FTC unfairness authority. Within a
year, the new unfairness statement was applied in Horizon Corp.,"'3
and courts later upheld the 1980 Unfairness Statement criteria. 2"
In 1994, Congress largely codified the 1980 Unfairness Statement as
law. 65 This brief recounting of the history of the FTC's unfairness
policy reveals how nonbinding "interpretative guidelines" can
quickly become influential institutions. 6 ' In such cases, the forces
of institutionalization this Article focuses on take a back seat to the
direct channel of administrative adjudication.
More interestingly, introduction of a revised standard did not
foreclose the possibility that the earlier standard might maintain its
own identity.26 7 That is, whereas the new standard might piggyback
on the institutional base of the old standard, the old standard might
263. Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464, 849-50 (1981).
264. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 971-84 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
266. The purpose of such nonbinding guidelines is to interpret the statute. When strong
deference is required, owing to statutory language, the forces of institutionalization, as in the
federal unfairness setting, are less likely to be important for guidelines issued by the relevant
agency. Strong deference is typically given to agencies that have cease-and-desist authority
over their own statute. When little deference is required, institutionalization becomes a
potentially important factor in the influence of the document. The EEOC's interpretations of
Title VII discrimination based on sex, religion, or national origin are examples in which
interpretative guidelines are given limited deference. The EEOC lacked cease and desist
powers under the Civil Rights Act, and for many years was even unable to bring suits under
the Act. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,1995 UTAH L. REV.
51, 66. However, the guidelines were quite prominent, as actions by employers following the
interpretative guidelines of the EEOC were given immunity and the EEOC had a
"gatekeeper" role in screening private suits. See, e.g., id. at 88-102, 107 (concluding the EEOC
has implied law-interpreting authority under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII); John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of
JudicialDeference to EEOC InterpretativeGuidelines, 1ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987) (proposing that
courts defer to EEOC's interpretative guidelines in certain situations).
267. A similar divergence is also possible for the merger guidelines; the fact that the states
had to bring merger cases in federal court made it much harder for two separate institutions
to be maintained than in the unfairness cases.

2006]

GUIDELINE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

851

still maintain its own institutional identity. The question of a
separate identity is of limited interest in the federal setting because
the new guidelines effectively replace the older guidelines for policy
and judicial purposes. However, the separate identity raises
interesting issues for state court rulings that interpret the unfairness power created under "little FTC Act" statutes.
Michael Greenfield has investigated how a number of states have
relied on the FTC's definitions of unfairness. About half of the states
have enacted "little FTC Acts" with language outlawing "unfair" acts
or practices, and most of these statutes direct the courts to give some
level of consideration to FTC and federal court interpretations.26 8
Greenfield found that "most states pay lip service to the statutory
direction that they 'be guided by' interpretations of section 5 of the
FTC Act, but in fact they adhere to pre-1980 articulations."2 6' 9
Unlike with federal tribunals, a new federal unfairness policy
statement is not immediately a strong institution from the perspective of the state courts. Thus, the influence of a federal unfairness
policy statement would change over time as the statement
strengthened-or weakened-as an institution from the states'
perspective. This process of institutionalization follows lines similar
to those discussed for the federal merger guidelines: the institution
would strengthen to the extent that the statements frame the
debates before the court, become more widely understood and argued
by the litigants, and ultimately become adopted in federal and state
court rulings. A substantial change to the federal guidelines, such as
the 1980 Policy Statement, would reduce the strength of the previous
institution-the 1964 Cigarette Rule's Statement of Basis and
Purpose -because that guideline has been at least partially stripped
of the benefit it gets from the "consideration" requirement in most
state statutes. But such a revision does not imply the institution's
demise; in fact, if the previous institution was strong and sufficiently
different, it might theoretically prevail over the newer standard. In
addition, most courts framed their choices as either the Cigarette
Rule or the Policy Statement, and did not treat these statements as
268. Greenfield, supranote 230, at 1896.
269. Id. at 1929; see also Bob Lipson, Unfairness in Consumer ProtectionCases, WASH. ST.
BAR NEWS, May 2002, http://www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/archives/2002/may02-consumer.htm (discussing FTC unfairness cases at both state and federal levels).
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sources from which to derive a more independent definition of
unfairness.27 °
Greenfield's finding that most states remained moored to the
earlier FTC's Cigarette Rule and the apparent desire of the state
courts to use the entire statement, rather than its component parts,
support the idea that the Cigarette Rule remained an institution
separate from and actually in conflict with the Unfairness Statement
that superseded it in the federal arena. Apparently, old institutions
just do not die, and sometimes they do not even fade away.
C. FederalSentencing Guidelines:Deinstitutionalization
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines present a fascinating case
when viewed through the lens of institutionalization or, more
accurately, deinstitutionalization. From their inception, until
relatively recently, the Sentencing Guidelines were binding on the
courts. In its 2005 ruling in United States v. Booker, the Supreme
Court declared the guidelines unconstitutional and effectively
remedied the constitutional infirmity by declaring that the guidelines would be discretionary rather than binding. 271 The framework
regarding institutionalization can usefully direct our inquiry into the
future evolution of sentencing law. Namely, the extent to which the
Sentencing Guidelines continue to influence the law-despite the
judicial fiat regarding deinstitutionalization-will depend on many
of the factors discussed throughout this Article.
Immediately following the Booker ruling, a heated debate ensued
as to whether legislation was needed to prevent sentencing decisions
from devolving into unprincipled, inconsistent rulings .27 2 Writing one
270. Greenfield and others have noted that many state courts would avoid discussion of the
Policy Statement-and the federal court cases applying that Statement. See, e.g., Greenfield,
supra note 230, at 1900. This phenomenon could be explained by the courts' avoidance of the
problem of harmonizing two somewhat conflicting positions. Such treatment would be less
troubling if the courts believed they could mix and match the factors contained in each
statement. But, as Greenfield noted, the Connecticut Supreme Court seems to adopt-perhaps
disingenuously-both the 1964 Cigarette Rule and the 1980 Policy Statement. See id. at 1916.
271. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-63 (2005). The Federal Sentencing Act
"still requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals."
Id. at 223.
272. Justice Breyer, for the majority, recognized but discounted a dissenting Justice
Scalia's '"ears of a 'discordant symphony,' 'excessive disparities,' and 'havoc."' Id. at 263.
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year after the ruling, Douglas Berman and William Saxbe noted that
"the Booker decision does not appear to have radically changed
either the basic practices or typical outcomes in the federal sentencing system.... In short, a culture of guideline compliance has
persisted after Booker."2 7 To what extent is that general compliance
desirable? Is that level of compliance likely to continue? As Berman
and Saxbe also noted, ."more time will be needed to assess Booker's
full impact ...
[it] has the potential to transform federal sentencing
law."27' 4 Guideline institutionalization provides a useful framework
for understanding Booker's influence or lack thereof.
1. Degrees of Deference
The Supreme Court declared the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. The remedy to that profound infirmity was modification of
the Sentencing Guidelines' status under the law. If, however, the
courts continue to treat the guidelines as de facto binding, owing to
their institutionalization, the question then becomes to what extent
has the constitutional infirmity of the guidelines actually been
remedied. This question, of course, raises the central and somewhat
intractable issue that arose within the merger guideline setting-namely, how to assess whether the courts are excessively
deferring to a nonbinding guideline system. As within the antitrust
context, the absence of a sufficiently delineated administrative law
doctrine of deference regarding such agency pronouncements
provides a fertile ground for the forces of institutionalization to help
shape the Sentencing Guidelines' influence. Particular attention
must be paid to the extent to which the guidelines are imposed in a
manner that invites debate about the proper standard, or in a
manner that permits no discussion.
Even if the guidelines are not treated as de facto binding, they will
invariably exert a powerful influence through framing the terms of
the debate. The majority in Booker noted that "[tlhe district courts,
while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those

273. Douglas A. Berman & William B. Saxbe, Perspectiveson Booker's Potential,18 FED.
SENT. R. 79, 2005 WL 4652499, at *1.
274. Id.
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Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing. '' 27 Towards
that end, examining the reasoning of courts that ultimately issue
27 6
sentences that are inconsistent with the guidelines is important.
For example, do the courts still apply the guidelines in the first
instance and then depart from them? Though departure from the
guidelines is important, the extent to which the courts allow the
guidelines to continue to frame their inquiry is equally as important.
Though most attention appears to focus on the district courts, the
appellate courts' treatment of Booker must also be considered. As
Justice Scalia pondered in his dissent, "[w]ill appellate review for
'unreasonableness' preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by
discouraging district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines
ranges? 2 77 As with the merger guidelines, one must consider which
avenues of inquiry are stressed, or perhaps even precluded, as a
result of the guideline framework.
2. PrivateParty Incentives
The incentives of those before the court in sentencing cases are
different than in merger cases. In merger cases, the guidelines
address the courts' consideration of the issues as to which party
should prevail on the merits. In sentencing cases, obviously, that
issue is already resolved. Defendants have every incentive to
vigorously argue whatever can assist in their sentencing hearing. In
a merger case, by contrast, the guidelines' nonbinding posture
results in a situation where it is unclear if it assists the private party
to directly clash with the guidelines themselves, rather than to sidestep or distinguish how they are applicable. 7 8
3. Expertise
The merger guidelines' express purpose was to enhance consistency in the application of the law. The guidelines also reflected the
275. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.
276. Id. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "the (oddly) surviving requirement" that the
sentencing courts must articulate "the specific reason for" departure from the Guidelines).
277. Id. at 313.
278. The government's incentives also differ here. For example, the Federal Sentencing
Commission, not the federal prosecutors themselves, generate the Sentencing Guidelines.
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considered judgment or expertise of those in power when they were
promulgated, and of those perpetuating them. The merger guidelines' implicit purpose was to share agency expertise regarding what
is often considered to be an extremely technical area of law-a
perspective that has become more commonplace as the role of
economics within antitrust has become more pronounced. By
contrast, the primary justification for the Federal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984,279 which established the Sentencing Guidelines, was
more clearly focused on the inequities that were perceived to arise
from the inconsistency characterizing criminal sentences.2 8 °
However, a strong line of criticism emerged in the wake of adopting
the Sentencing Guidelines that forcing sentencing into an artificial
framework-epitomized by the sentencing table itself-would result
in injustice from the lack of flexibility, when at one time such
injustice had been attributed to the presence of too much
flexibility.2 81 Consequently, despite the absence of recent precedent
in which sentencing was discussed, one could imagine the courts'
feeling better able to step more quickly into that role than would be
28 2
the case with regard to antitrust.
Using my theory of guideline institutionalization as a prism
through which to view the Sentencing Guidelines does not yield any
easy answers regarding how the law should or even will develop.
However, it does identify the factors that society needs to consider
when charting its future course. And, more importantly,
institutionalization clearly indicates that the conversion of the
Sentencing Guidelines from binding to nonbinding constitutes only
the first in a series of decisions that society will need to make.

279. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C. (2000)).
280. Booker, 543 U.S. at 305 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Guidelines included

policy determinations regarding past sentencing practices).
281. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1683 (1992) (noting that guidelines
must allow for some discretion).
282. Booker, 543 U.S. at 290 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting numerous district court
judges whose hostility to the guidelines was well known).
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CONCLUSION

Since the introduction of merger guidelines in the 1960s, antitrust
guidelines have proliferated. The federal antitrust agencies have
promulgated guidelines addressing, among other topics, the licensing
of intellectual property, collaborations among competitors, international operations, and the health care industry."' Moreover, the
antitrust agencies frequently receive requests for the promulgation
of still more guidelines. Most recently, there have been additional
calls for the antitrust agencies to devise guidelines regarding
standard-setting practices2 "' and slotting allowances."' This increased reliance on guidelines has also been mirrored in other
regulatory arenas.2 86
The merger guidelines provide an ideal setting for assessing the
nature of judicial reliance on administrative agencies. The merger
guidelines have persisted in varying forms for nearly four decades.
During that time, they have encountered substantial changes in
political and social climates, the role of economics, and administrative law standards.
My analysis of the history of the merger guidelines and merger
rulings shows that the courts have ceded significant responsibility
to interpret the law to the antitrust agencies. I attribute this
unfortunate development to the merger guidelines' institutionalization, which allowed them to acquire influence that extended
beyond the persuasive power of their ideas. The process of institutionalization resulted from the convergence of many factors and
evolved over time. Several of the key mechanisms that promoted or
sustained the process of institutionalization were a relative lack of
controlling authority and an ambiguous level of deference owed the
283. See Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n: All Bureau Guidelines, http://www.
ftc.gov/bc/bcburguidelines. htm (presenting all FTC/DOJ antitrust guidelines) (last visited
Nov. 25, 2006).
284. David A. Balto & Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-Setting Disputes: The Need for
Guidelines, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/baltoprywes (last visited
Nov. 25, 2006).
285. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON
SLOIrING ALLOWANCES AND OTHER MARKETING PRACTICES IN THE GROCERY INDUSTRY 66-67
(2001), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/slottingallowancesreportfinal.pdf.
286. Anthony, supra note 214, at 1316 ("[I]t is manifest that nonobservance of APA
rulemaking requirements is widespread.").
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promulgating agencies. As the guideline institution strengthened, its
direct effect was augmented through more subtle mechanisms of
influence, such as framing.
The evolution of the guidelines themselves has consistently been
one of including greater flexibility and analysis of more factors. It
must be recognized that, just as the guidelines require flexibility, so
too the interpreters of the law and of the guidelines themselves
require flexibility. Excessive reliance on the letter of the guidelines
constitutes a violation of their spirit.

